

R 180039

JPRS-EPS-84-064

18 May 1984

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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EAST EUROPE REPORT
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ALBANIA

AUTHORITIES ALLOWING MORE CULTURE FROM WEST TO ENTER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Apr 84 p 30

[Article by Kaija Virta: "Albanian Art Opening Up"]

[Text] This spring Albanian literature has taken a great step toward international awareness. A prose anthology, which in addition to Ismail Kadare, almost the only writer known in the West, presents 19 other writers from the Middle Ages to our decade, has appeared in France.

Pleased, Dalan Shaplllo, the chief editor of the Albanian literary monthly, NENTOR (November), told us what well-known French critic Alain Bosquet asserted on reading the anthology: In Albania socialist realism does not mean the same thing it does in certain other countries, rather through it they are really able to freely express both the people's and the artist's special individual qualities.

When I met Shaplllo in Tirana in March, the Albanian cultural world was just getting ready for a momentous event, the Third Writers Association Congress, on 23 April. The previous congress was in 1969, during a politically quite different period when relations with China were still very close.

We get a broad view of the whole cultural picture from the congress because, in addition to writers, other artists: people connected with the theater, dancers, film makers, painters and composers, also belong to the 1,500-member association.

October Is Art Month

Albania's austere press often insists on reporting production in a stiffly formal way in its cultural issues as well. During the time between the congress and the congress produced in the province, we read in the news: "26 novels, 41 plays, 35 anthologies of short stories and poems and 17 exhibits." Dalan Shaplllo, however, felt that the congress' most important function is one of content: "improving quality and increasing active participation." As concerns the latter, he explained that he meant delving into real problems instead of glossing over conventional reality.

The head of the Writers Association expressed similar opinions when he recently referred to the "schematism, stereotypism and vulgarism" of Albanian films and theater as a common fault.

Albania has its own remedy for raising intellectual, artistic and ideological standards. One of the Writers Association's duties is to organize its members' occasional direct participation in the world of production. Not, however, necessarily in terms of strenuous physical labor -- that, in the Albanians' opinion, is a typical manifestation of Chinese excess.

They also try to create direct cultural contacts with the masses by giving them public opportunities for criticism. October is "art month," during which time writers and other artists are annually sent round the country to participate in meetings organized at workplaces. Shaplllo told us that, in light of his experience, the judgment of the masses does not in the final analysis differ from that of the professional critics, only insofar as it is expressed "without kid gloves," that is, free of any theoretical affectation.

Films Favored Over Theater

Dalan Shaplllo is himself a writer. In the French anthology he is represented in "In the Craftsmen's Section of Town," which depicts the disintegration of a city shoemaker, tinsmith and sheet-metal worker milieu during the early years of socialism.

Shaplllo's specialty as a critic is native poetry and he told us that the current problem is that it is being drawn across the line separating the two in the direction of prose. Shaplllo criticized poets for blurring the line between the two. In his opinion, there must be some value in preserving its musical quality, its rhythmic form since they have been preserved in the literary tradition for such a long time.

In Albania a volume of poetry generally has a press run of from 5 to 10,000 copies, while a press run for a novel is about three times as large (the country's population is just under 3 million). He cited as an example an exceptional 100,000-copy edition of Dritero Agolli's volume of poetry, "Mother Albania," which is included in schools' reading program.

Considering its size, Albania is particularly productive as a film-making country. Planned for this year are 14 full-length films, about 20 animated films and 40 documentaries. Shaplllo said that films are generally felt to be artistically superior to theater in Albania.

The Rise and Fall of Comrade Zhylo

In Tirana I saw one of last year's most popular native plays, "The Rise and Fall of Comrade Zhylo," which is based on Writers Association chairman Dritero Agolli's novel that mocks the bureaucracy.

The Sunday-evening performance audience was strikingly young, most of them under 30. The people at the theater told us that young people generally fill four-fifths of the theater. This can in part be explained as being due to

Albania's high postwar birth rate and in part because Tirana is a university town.

"Comrade Zhylo" is considered to be one of Agolli's best novels. The above-mentioned French anthology even praises it as being the Albanian "Ubu," a fiery speech in defense of ridicule and humor and against self-importance and stiff phrases.

One of the actors dramatized the National Theater in Tirana's presentation from the novel that appeared in 1973 and the director is also a member of the theater group who ordinarily works as an actor. The young audience, of course, thoroughly enjoyed the turns of fate that at times got director Zhylo involved in bouts of ranting and at times frothing at the mouth, but, at least from behind the language barrier, the performance appeared to be moving more along the lines of conventional farce than of bold satire.

The director of the theater, deep-voiced, eagle-nosed Pirro Mani, who learned to speak fluent Russian in Leningrad in the 1950's, seemed to be a bit dissatisfied with the dramatization of the play. He feels that satire is a particularly difficult genre in the theater and that in addition to that Agolli's broad, nuanced novel is a difficult play even for a more experienced dramatist.

From Shakespeare to Brecht

Mani said that the National Theater, Tirana's main theater, gives about 300 performances a year. Most of them are given outside of Tirana, specifically in the form of free performances in villages, small town factories or schools.

Operating with a troupe of 50, the National Theater turns out four or five premieres a year. Since Albania's translation policy follows strict ideological criteria, there are no very recent new foreign plays on the program. The members of the theater group mentioned Shakespeare, Schiller, Goldoni and Brecht as the most popular foreign playwrights.

Although the people at the theater whom I met said that they were suspicious of anything that came under the heading of experimental theater, they nevertheless seemed to be very much interested in world trends in their field. They are followed in Tirana through foreign dramatic film and tape sessions organized for professional groups in addition to the newspapers and books. The theater group has made three visits abroad, two of them in their own language area, the Albanian settlements of Kosovo in Yugoslavia and in Macedonia.

Finnish literature is virtually unknown in Albania. Martti Larni's "The Fourth Vertebra" is, to be sure, read here too; it has probably been translated from Russian since there is no one in the whole country who knows Finnish and is capable of doing literary translation.

There is in progress between Finland and Albania a fairly recent cultural exchange, the first fruit of which is probably the exchange of national cultural exhibits.

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MILITARY PERSONNEL CRITICIZED FOR LACK OF VIGILANCE

Sofia TRUDOVO DELO in Bulgarian 30 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Colonel Dimitur Atanasov: "Discipline Everywhere and in All Things; Vigilance a Permanent Duty"]

[Text] A hot summer day. On the city square drill in performing the retreat ceremony is in progress. Curious passersby shorten their pace to watch the proceedings. Two young men speak in a loud voice.

"See the commander of..."

"Together with..."

They call out the names and positions of the officers. They sense that the others are listening to them. And they obviously are somehow proud. You see how much we know? They apparently were recently discharged. They were in service somewhere in the vicinity. But they seem not to have given the oath or to have forgotten its words: "I swear that I will strictly guard state and military secrets..."

Many persons believe that by starting up a conversation on military subjects in a bus, on the street, or at the theater they impress the people around them, as if there were no more suitable place for such talk, or no more interesting topics. They talk to be heard and seen, and indeed they are. Many times even the walls have ears. Enemies hear, as well as friends, of course.

Private Ya. Biser was recently court-martialed in the unit in which officer Petrov serves. The young man had become accustomed to an easy life before coming into the army: girl friends, cassette recorders, "hangouts," a car, and the like. Military life seemed hard to him, so he decided to evade his obligations. But his comrades understood and put an end to his act. Possibly this offender is now very angry at his comrades. But he hardly knows how thankful he will be to them one day, when he understands what they saved him from, when he understands that they helped him. Such help is given only by true men. Soldiers do not want and do not allow their comrades to go astray.

How often foreign tourists turn out to be amateur photographers! Both the sentry at his post and the soldier on leave in the city and at home, in a training exercise, or at work on construction scaffolding must keep their

eyes wide open and their mouths firmly shut. Everyone--enlisted men, non-commissioned officers, commissioned officers--knows that service matters are not to be discussed with acquaintances, friends, and family members.

Private Birov wrote a letter to a friend of his, but the letter got lost. It was found and turned over to his commander. In the letter the soldier wrote in detail about where he was serving and what equipment he was learning to use. He boasted that a fearful weapon had been entrusted to his care, and described the properties of this weapon. In essence he betrayed a military secret. He forgot his military common sense.

"If Your Neighbor Knows, Everyone Knows"

No less thoughtless was the action of another soldier, who in a letter to a girl he knew wrote in detail about when he was to take part in an exercise, where it was to be held, how long it would take, and how it was to be conducted.

Such information is a real find for the enemy. He looks for just such letters as these. Important state and military secrets can be discovered from seemingly minor bits of information when they are organized and collected.

One more incident. During a tactical exercise the unit commanded by Officer Toshev occupied a bivouac. It stayed there only a few days and then returned to barracks. Envelopes with the address and city of the unit's location written on them, pages of the commander's notebook, and forms with calculations of the coordinates of fire positions and observation posts were left in the area of the tents.

Other examples of lowered vigilance are telephone conversations in which the rules are broken. It must not be forgotten that modern espionage techniques make it possible to listen in on and record all telephone calls with high accuracy. This is why it is absolutely impermissible to say everything over the telephone, sometimes without knowing who is on the other end of the line. Some persons think that code names, oblique references, and a telegraphic style in speaking over the telephone keep what is being said secret. But this is pure self-deception. Such naive "codes" will scarcely make it difficult for or deceive an experienced scout.

Other persons think that something or other will betray the enemy, either talk hostile to the people or patently hostile acts. But in reality, so as to arouse no suspicion, he will put his best foot forward. He inspires confidence and remains unnoticed. He seeks out the good-natured, the trusting, the obliging, and the scatterbrained. He outfits himself with forged documents, but also with genuine ones: party, Komsomol, and identification cards, passes, and others.

This is why military personnel must be very careful with their personal documents. Every lost document falling into the hands of the enemy can open the doors to an installation, institution, unit, or enterprise to an enemy scout.

The fact that some enlisted men, especially young ones, in their letters and conversations violate the rules relating to maintenance of secrecy is largely the fault of commanders and political workers and of Party and Komsomol organizations. They have not taken proper care to explain to them promptly what they may and may not write and say outside their units. In some units educational work in vigilance is treated as a fashion; respected today and forgotten tomorrow. Usually during the first months following the induction of young enlisted men or after a particular unpleasant incident, a campaign is instituted, a special "month" for increasing the vigilance of enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, and officers. Orders are issued, officers deliver lectures, inspections are carried out, and wall newspapers are published. But time passes and quiet returns. The lapses are repeated again.

But commanders and political workers should remember. The inculcation of vigilance in military personnel is by no means a short-term campaign but permanent, mandatory work, since vigilance cannot be instilled by mass events and general talk. Individual influence on the men is forgotten, or the vigilance requirements and the rules for preservation of secrets are studied and explained sporadically, as the occasion arises.

There are, of course, more examples of organized, permanent, and topical work to imbue personnel with a spirit of high vigilance. There are many examples of exercise of vigilance. At the risk of his life, Private Aleksandur Petrov, posted as a sentry, detained a civilian trying to break into a motor pool. While not in an official capacity, Sergeant Major Anastasov prevented the photographing of a unit area by foreign citizens. More such instances could be recounted.

But the deficiencies, lapses, tendency to boast, self-important behavior, pretended access to inside information, and the like are reasons for concern, and individual commanders adopt a liberal attitude toward such incidents.

A Sharp Weapon

The inculcation of vigilance naturally has nothing to do with suspiciousness or lack of trust in one's subordinates, comrades, and commanders. The transformation of vigilance into suspicion only serves the interests of the enemy. It is a question here of inculcating unswerving diligence, of striving to establish exemplary order everywhere and in all things. In the unit, at the headquarters, in the classroom, and at the construction site, order should prevail which will seal off the channels through which secrets might leak.

In taking the military oath, the young soldier swears that he will be vigilant. The party and the people oblige him to be vigilant. It is required by the interests of the country. Consequently, in the struggle with the enemy it is a primary duty of all personnel to keep a strong, sharp weapon with them at all times: vigilance.

RESULTS OF LODZ PROVINCE REPORTS-ELECTION CONFERENCE

Account of Proceedings, Discussion

Lodz GLOS ROBOTNICZY in Polish 24 Jan 84 pp 1, 3

[Article by Halina Batorowicz, Jerzy Galeba and Zdzislaw Strzepek: "Party Labor Program Consistent With Society's Expectations; Tadeusz Czechowicz, Member of the Central Committee Polituro, Is First Secretary of PZPR Lodz Committee"]

[Text] Yesterday the 23rd PZPR Lodz Reports-Elections Conference convened in the auditorium of the Interprovincial Party School with 394 delegates in attendance.

Tadeusz Czechowicz, Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the PZPR KL [Lodz Committee], in his opening statements to party debate on the subject of crucial socioeconomic issues stressed that the difficult phase of the bitter struggle with the political adversary, personal weaknesses, attempts to revert to former work routines has come to an end. Common sense, realism and ideological unity have prevailed in the Lodz organization.

In attendance at the conference sessions were the following: Jan Glowczyk, Central Committee secretary, candidate Politburo member; Kazimierz Morawski, chairman of the Central Audit Commission [CKR]; Grazyna Kotnowska, Central Party Control Commission [CKKP] vice chairman; Edward Grzywa, minister of the chemical and light industries; Eugeniusz Trajer, deputy minister of construction and building materials; Zdzislaw Pakula, NBP [National Bank of Poland] vice president; Jerzy Chojnacki, president of the United Peasant Party Provincial Committee [ZSL WK]; Stanislaw Zalobny, chairman of the Lodz Committee of the Democratic Party [SD LK]; Prof Mieczyslaw Serwinski, chairman of the People's Council of the City of Lodz; Jozef Niewiadomski, mayor of the city of Lodz; Igor Sikirycki, chairman of the Lodz Council of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON LR].

The following official representatives of the new professional unions were cordially welcomed at the conference hall: Pawel Szymanski, chairman of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union [NSZZ] of the Light Industry Federation; Wieslaw Gicela, NSZZ Transportation Workers; as well as Zdzislaw Nikodemski from the federation of metal workers and Jan Dubinski from the federation of chemists.

Members of the Builders of People's Poland, delegates to the Ninth Congress, members of the party's Central Committee, delegates, representatives of numerous organizations and activists also attended the conference.

In charge of the conference were: Jadwiga Nowakowska, Witold Sidowicz and Henryk Scholl. Greetings and best wishes were received at the conference from, among others, the District Committee of the CPSU in Ivanov, from the executive boards of the party's provincial committees in Sieradz and Skierniewice.

The agenda report was delivered by Tadeusz Czechowicz, member of the Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the PZPR KL, on behalf of the KL executive board.

Following the elections of a mandate commission, an election commission and a resolutions commission, Tadeusz Czechowicz was elected first secretary of the Lodz Committee by individual secret balloting. A total of 121 members and 35 alternates were elected to the Lodz Committee body, and 51 individuals each were elected to the Provincial Party Control Commission [WKKP] as well as to the Lodz Audit Commission [LKR].

During the conference, Jan Glowczyk, candidate Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, addressed the assembly.

At the end of the conference an agenda resolution was passed indicating a new phase in the course of action for the Lodz echelon.

The First Plenary Session of the PZPR Lodz Committee

In the late hours of the night, the date already Tuesday, 24 January, members of the newly elected offices of the Lodz party echelon assembled for the first plenary session, which was conducted by Tadeusz Czechowicz, first secretary of the PZPR KL. The following were elected secretaries of the KL: Andrzej Hampel, Konrad Janio, Kazimierz Orzechowski, Haroslaw Pietrzyk and Maria Wawrzynska.

Furthermore, the executive board of the PZPR KL consisted of the following: Marian Anysz, Stanislaw Dworczyk, Wojciech Jablonski, Anna Janiak, Barbara Jarocinska-Wreczycka, Henryk Jodelis, Edward Krol, Roman Matuszynski, Bronislaw Moczowski, Jerzy Nastalczyk, Jozef Niewiadomski, Teresa Sadlowska, Romuald Skowronski, Monika Szczesniak and Miroslaw Tosik.

Grzegorz Pagowski was elected chairman of the Lodz Audit Commission.

Next Friday, 27 January, was designated as the date for the first meeting of the Provincial Party Control Committee.

Course of Discussions

A discussion took place following the delivery of the executive board's report in which the following participated in succession: Bohdan Cegielski,

Roman Matuszynski, Edward Krol, Witold Bald, Krzysztof Zebrowski, Jerzy Chojnacki, Stefan Jozwiak, Eugeniusz Wojt, Karolina Muszynska, Bronislaw Moczowski, Stanislaw Zalobny, Mieczyslaw Kolosowski, Adam Junka, Wojciech Jablonski, Romuald Skowronski, Zbigniew Zapart, Adam Koziol, Marian Anysz, Janusz Chmielewski, Bogumila Marczuk, Pawel Szymanski, Jan Marlicki, Karol Stryjski, Halina Kwiatek, Jozef Niewiadomski, Zenon Rozko, Zygmunt Maslowski, Dariusz Michno, Boguslaw Sieradzki, Andrzej Rycenter, Henryk Stypulkowski, Zenon Michalski.

The multiproblem discussion once again confirmed the fact of close and irrevocable attachment by party members to ideological, political and economic questions. The delegates-debaters spoke on issues concerning their communities, their statements were often critical. A considerable amount of discussion was devoted to the problems of economic reform and the work of man, as well as to socio-vital issues of the work force of individual enterprises and communities. There was no lack of concern in the discussion regarding the issue of the country's future, or of comments pointing out the necessity for strengthening the national rebirth movement and assuring safety, law and order in the country and in our province. Internal party problems occupied a special place in the discussion. Among other things, the conferees stressed that increased activity on the part of party members contributes to the growing authority of the PZPR, and party works serving the working class strengthen society's faith in the service role of the PZPR towards the working class.

In the first portion of the discussion, the conferees alternately commented on the necessity of formulating desirable postures for young people as well as certain professional groups. With regard to young people--and this was emphasized in particular--previous activities have not proved to be very effective. Mental stereotypes and myths in all the more important socio-structural questions continue to distress the minds of the young generation. In the existing situation, it is imperative to address the training propositions of the educational system critically. It should also be stated openly that in difficult circumstances, the preparation and ability of youth organizations to influence the young generation politically have not been fully realized. The conferees regarded the influence of basic party organizations on young party members and candidates as inadequate.

One of the means--it was stated in the discussion--for releasing the constructive initiative of young people lies in increasing the amount of useful social employment for the benefit of home plants as well as communities. It is necessary to teach the young people that one of the means for one's self-realization is solid and productive work. However, in enterprises further united efforts of individual representative bodies will have a beneficial influence on the formation of satisfactory postures. Zbigniew Zapart from Boruty in Zgierz, in addressing the conference mainly on the problems and indecisions of young people, said among other things that insofar as young people are concerned, it is necessary in the party to remember the need to rectify many failures. This cannot be accomplished immediately, but it must be done by consistently observing the implementation of resolutions of the Central Committee's Ninth Plenum, which was devoted

precisely to young people. Wojciech Jablonski, chairman of the Lodz Board of the Polish Socialist Youth Union [ZL ZSMP], in his address emphasized that the future of the party is associated with the youth. Therefore, everything should be done to recruit the youth for the party's program.

Issues involving young people in the party and the role of the party in the lives of young people recurred at the conference rostrum during many hours of interesting discussion.

During the conference, there was discussion on people's and party attitudes; there was discussion on the professional ethics of various communities. The address of Szczepan Jozwiak, representing the Polesie health service, was enthusiastically received. He stressed that it is imperative--when evaluating the attitudes of health service employees--not to generalize, because every generalization can be harmful to people who do their work well, who are honestly engaged. In recent years, during the country's most difficult period, health service employees--even though they differ in convictions and political views--worked very honestly and voluntarily without counting hours of work for which wages are received. The fact that the health service community is sympathetic towards an individual and always prepared to serve him is also demonstrated, among other things, by the immediate willingness of scores of people who volunteered their aid to victims of the Retkin tragedy.

Many conferees representing industrial enterprises spoke on economic-farming issues. Among other things, proposals were made for improvement in existing concepts of incentive methods and in wages on the basis of systems-type economic reform solutions. Such action is necessary, Karolina Muszynska from the May 1 Warsaw Cotton Industry Plants [WZPB] emphasized in her address, for it is necessary to create incentives, to make people aware that it pays to work well but that it does not pay to be idle.

The conferees mentioned that an effort should be made to improve the existing method of instructing rank and file party members in questions associated with the introduction of economic reform, as well as in the question of fulfilling the supervisory function by the party in this respect. From a poll conducted by the District Committee [KD] of Gorna among the managing cadre of industrial enterprises in that district, it is evident that one-half of the member groups of labor self-government are not informed on economic problems. It is, therefore, necessary diligently to prepare people to fulfill responsible functions and at the same time to see to it that the concept of the incentive method is not interpreted in a very peculiar manner by certain enterprises. The only hope remains--as Witold Bald from Gorna stressed in his address--in the fact that the new law on wages eliminates the confusion hitherto existing in this respect.

The conference was not devoid of questions associated with farm production and matters concerning people who are producers of food. A young farmer from the gmina of Rzgow, Eugeniusz Wojt, warned of the alarming "flight" of the farm youth to the city. This emigration from the villages is not accidental.

Many young people become discouraged by the hardships they encounter along the way after inheriting the farm from their parents. The desire of the young farmer to expand farming accommodations and modernize farm production meets with obstacles of a financial nature. Credit which is so readily extended carries a rate of interest that is too high, however. This discourages people. During the recent reports-elections campaign, petitions were also submitted by young female farmers, among others, who feel that they should have the same right to educational allowances enjoyed by women employed in the city.

There was also discussion at the conference concerning the problem of law and order and safety. Extensive treatment was afforded this subject by Gen Bronislaw Maczkowski, chief of the Provincial Office on Internal Affairs [WUSW]. Among other things, he said that the various endeavors of the law and order services had produced the desired results in the sphere of coping with dangers threatening the safety of the state and the destabilization of sociopolitical and economic life. Insofar as delinquency is concerned, there has been a definite increase in the detection of all kinds of delinquency. Very substantial results have been noted in combating speculation. Contributing their efforts to the work undertaken by the WUSW and the regional offices subject to it were the aktiv of the Volunteer Reserve of Citizens Militia [ORMO], inspectors of professional and public supervision as well as--which is tremendously valuable--the labor aktiv. Action was likewise taken against individuals who enrich themselves excessively at public expense, and a series of tax violations were exposed in the private sector. The reasons for the occurrence of mismanagement and waste in the socialized economy lie in errors of public property and also in irrational management of land. Regarding the guilty, disciplinary conclusions are drawn and cadre and party organizations accept assignments intended to counteract mismanagement and waste.

Party affairs provided a rich flow of discussion. It was stressed that the party has an obligation to defend the interests of working people and always give priority to social interest in its endeavors. During the conference there was discussion on the necessity for party members to give an account of tasks assigned to them; severe treatment was proposed for those comrades who are "two-faced": one in the employment plant and his party organization, another in the family home, the place of residence. Drawing attention to these matters in his address was Mieczyslaw Kolosowski from Konstantynow.

Subsequent conferees, in their statements, called for the need to develop multidirectional systems-type activities aimed at eliminating the devastation that was perpetrated on public consciousness, especially that of the young generation. It is also necessary to strive for improvement of the present system of ideological training of rank and file party members. The 40th anniversary celebration of Polish People's Republic will present an excellent occasion to accomplish these endeavors. It is likewise necessary to define precisely the building stage of socialism at which we presently find ourselves and unequivocally state in which sphere we shall experience an abundance of members in our economy in the future--private farming, private handicraft, etc. Certainly public practice enriches the cognitive character

of ideology and it is necessary to fight for the construction of a socialist society. Progressive stages cannot be ignored, even as we speak of the continuity of social development. Polish education plays an important role in solving fundamental social and economic problems. It is necessary to eliminate divisions in the sphere of individual educational disciplines in order to prevent the phenomenon of particularism from gaining prominence. There exists a need for uniform control in the development of education, the creation of an adequate system of scientific research and a new cadre policy.

One of the stimulators for an economic boom is handicraft. Certainly handicraft was needed immediately after the war and today it also stands ready to fill the gaps presently existing in the economic operations of key industry enterprises. The reality of handicraft is entirely different from the stereotypes plaguing the minds of average citizens. In February 1984 rigorous supervision of handicraft plants will be conducted in Lodz City Province, and those proprietors of workshops who violate their prerogatives will be eliminated, because the concern of handicraft is the attainment of public esteem.

An important line of discussion dealt with the problems of party instruction. It will not replace, it was stressed, consistent and firm action on the part of all party members in the workplace or the community. Party work with young candidates and graduate members of the Polish United Workers Party should be conducted openly and sincerely, without insinuations. The new comrades who have been accepted into the party must be the best of the best, enjoying the confidence of their own professional communities.

During the conference considerable space was devoted to cultural matters, and in particular to mass culture and dissemination. Halina Kwiatkowska from the Lodz House of Culture spoke, among other things, on this subject. She emphasized that in the dissemination of culture today we can tolerate neither rubbish nor junk. The thing to do is to obtain a sufficient number of properly trained cadres to disseminate culture.

Supporters of culture as well as educational and creative communities should play an appreciable role in solving our difficult political, social and economic problems. Colleges and research institutes located in Lodz as well as specialists from the various "disciplines" of knowledge working in them, whose names are often well known in Poland and abroad, constitute a solid foundation of hope for aid to education in solving the fundamental needs of the economy and national culture.

An important task for the newly elected officials of the Lodz party organization is the further intensification of PZPR activities in the community of culture and the arts and sciences. Endeavors should be spent on uniting the efforts of all party supporters of culture, all party sectors into one channel, in the striving for one goal--the creation of socialist values. By its essence, culture is the plane of ideological struggle. Greater commitment is expected of creative artist party members. It is inadmissible to exploit culture and art for the purpose of conducting a struggle with the socialist state and the party.

Jozef Niewiadomski, mayor of Lodz, spoke on many problems confronting the city and province. A special place in his address was reserved for the problems of housing construction, the educational-training base, and environmental protection. I share the critical observations coursing through the conference--said the mayor--but also we have nothing to be ashamed of--he added--in assessing our accomplishments to date. The number of smoking factory chimneys in Lodz has been reduced from 840 to 20. The harmful consequences of the production of cellulose have likewise been eliminated. Currently one of the most essential problems for environmental protection is the continued construction of the community sewerage treatment plant. Obviously, the tempo of the work can be expedited; however, let us not forget that this would take place at the expense of the construction of residential blocks which an enormous number of Lodz families are still waiting for.

Issues dealing with attitudes of party members occupied an important place in the work of the Lodz party organization during the past administration. This was necessary and produced calculable results. The clearest confirmation of this is the fact that every successive inspection conducted by the Provincial Party Control Committee [WKKP] confirmed the removal of shortcomings occurring in party work as well as considerable progress in the implementation of assignments. Of help here as well were the meetings of control groups with interested supervisors from the departments or echelons being examined, during the course of which not only were the results of control discussed, but at the same time discussions were conducted, views exchanged, and--which is most important--methods of removing occurring irregularities established. Adam Junka, chairman of the retiring Lodz Audit Commission, covered this subject extensively.

Glowczyk, Czechowicz Speeches

Lodz GLOS ROBOTNICZY in Polish 24 Jan 84 p 3

[Text] Jan Glowczyk, Politburo member, Central Committee secretary:

Many problems troubling the party were covered in discussions at the Lodz conference, as well as those concerning the socioeconomic life of the region. The subject of seeking new forms for strengthening party ties with the working class and with society on the basis of fulfilling a service role towards it dominated the discussion. It is not permissible for the party aktiv to forget the significance of these ties.

The party has survived the siege, it is not obliged to defend itself. It is the party that has today accepted the initiative in the political struggle, that can program its work, function tactically with alacrity. We go forward but we cannot become complacent, because internal adversaries and external enemies continue to attack the party and socialism, although they clearly change tactics. The form of direct political confrontation did not fulfill their expectations, no power method passed the test, in view of which the opposition seeks to appear "conciliatory."

The Reagan administration is aware that the Polish public correctly assesses the results of its policy. If 51 percent of the Poles in the 1981 poll state that they regard the United States as a friendly country, by last fall this indicator had fallen to 19 percent. Hence a change in tactics, the creation of the advocate of understanding, conciliatory gestures.

The damage inflicted upon us by Western restrictions are irreparable. They required the reorientation of our industry, the pursuit of imports from other directions, anti-import production, they limited our possibilities for satisfying public needs and exports. In spite of all, the Polish economy moved forward--in 1983 industrial production increased by 7 percent and the national income by 4 percent. These indications are better than had been anticipated. Furthermore, it is worth stressing that for the first time in 10 years national gross income did not exceed that earned. Previously we lived on credit.

There are still considerable reserves in our economy, in organizations, labor, discipline, productivity, technology. Large outlays are not required in order to utilize them. The lack of work hands also compels us to seek those reserves. On the other hand, increased productivity is a necessity.

During the conference, considerable discussion was devoted to problems involving the young generation and were stressed by the Central Committee secretary. Every generation wishes to change the existing reality. After all Marx taught that philosophers only explain the world, whereas it is important to change it. Certainly the young people should change reality by erecting socialism. It is necessary to convince them of this and assist educators and youth organizations in forming such committed postures for our successors.

It is necessary to change the style and methods of work in our propaganda by reaching for that which is most efficient and effective. It is necessary to pay more attention to criticism, including complaints which people approach the party with. At present we have entered upon the second stage of the struggle--the difficult and long-lasting stage of ideological struggle. The party must clearly define its identity, prepare an ideological declaration at the National Conference, and convince that weaknesses resulted from the lack of Marxism and socialism in everyday practice and that this was provoked by protests of the working class.

In the dialogue of uniting and understanding, the party cannot neglect the ideological struggle. This is also the line of the PZPR Ninth Congress.

Tadeusz Czechowicz, Poliburo member, first secretary of PZPR Lodz Committee:

A year ago a review of the initial term of administration was conducted at the Reports-Programs Conference. At that time it was stated in the resolution adopted: "This is a period of trial and struggle for the PZPR, in defending the party and socialism against the brutal attacks of enemies, and in restoring ability to fulfill its leading role in society."

The strength of the workers' party is derived from its ties with the working class, and with the masses, and any description of these ties generates errors and reversals in our work. In governing itself by these principles, the party has contributed to progress in the sociopolitical stabilization of the country, to calming emotions and repressing agitation. This process continued throughout the entire period of the past administration.

Problems of reform, of attempts to provide food and basic goods for everyday use, the problems of wages and employment, the struggle with enemies of socialism as well as social pathology, union movement problems, the struggle with speculation and a decline in productive work--these are a summary of party activities.

In resolving these difficult issues we have committed many errors and we have displayed weaknesses, it is true; however, we can say that we have prevented a collapse in the economy of the province, hunger, an atmosphere of tension and disturbances, and of course such dangers did exist. The Lodz Committee devoted considerable attention to these matters. We initiated a series of meetings with representatives of party and government management. We have made many difficult decisions. The people of Lodz and the province, the working class, deserve thanks for the voluntary work, civic posture and an understanding of all these problems which have confronted our country.

I am grateful to those representatives of creative communities--scientists, writers, union members, activists and members of youth organizations--who in ever increasing numbers are participating in these affairs which serve the national welfare and mutual understanding.

The process of stabilization still remains and is not free from dangers. They persist in the difficult though improving economic situation and are derived from difficulties in initiating reform, consumer goods shortages and the many burdensome troubles of daily existence.

The present situation, as never before, reveals a deep sense of party activity, of our efforts in the work of party consolidation, in the creation of alliance and national understanding.

"The leading and guiding role of the Marxist-Leninist party"--we read in the resolution of the Ninth PZPR Congress--"vanguard of the working class which most fully expresses the vital interests of the entire nation, is an essential condition in the development of socialism in Poland. Its class, labor character gives the PZPR the right to such a role."

Recent years have brought changes in the social structure of the party; many workers have left. They presently represent 44.4 percent. This is a disturbing phenomenon, but it can be stated that gradually favorable changes are occurring even in this sphere. In 1983 twice as many candidates were accepted into the party than in 1981. Among them, workers represent almost 40 percent. Exodus from the party has decreased decisively. In 1983, party organizations and echelons terminated more than three times fewer members than in 1981.

The reports-elections campaign in the Lodz party organization demonstrated that a consolidation of the party is in progress and is strengthening it. The ability to fulfill a leading and guiding role is on the rise not only through party echelons in the employment plants. The role and significance of party groups are gathering strength, they are seeking new forms and methods of action. Party groups can effectively react to the needs of the working classes, handle problems that irritate workers and take action in rapid and expert removal of ills.

In our lives there is much callousness and selfishness, waste of resources and common theft, alcoholism and confusion--phenomena tolerated also by party members. Do we need operational groups, external controls, in order to recognize the confusion prevailing around us?

The new administration should devote more attention to the young people. It is true that life is difficult for young people, as it is for all. The young people must also be bound by the principle that the level of their lives depends on their labors. More and more young people assume responsible positions in industry, culture and public life. There are more and more young directors, managers, experts.

We have 6,237 young party members in the Lodz party organization, approximately 540 of whom were elected to the executive boards of basic party organizations [POP] and branch party organizations [OOP]; 101 function as first secretaries. Youth unions, although struggling with various difficulties and experiencing their own confidence crisis, more and more frequently propose initiatives of a social and political nature. While recognizing these achievements it is, however, necessary to point out that we expect greater activity from youth organizations in the sphere of organizing free time, in the ideological and productive spheres. Schools and colleges play a fundamental role in the education of the young generation. However, in many schools the cultivation of ideological and political attitudes and a philosophy of life finds itself receding into the background.

The class union movement plays a large role in strengthening the forces of socialism. It has entered a new phase of its development. New national federations of professional unions are being created. Three federations have established their headquarters in Lodz. In the urban province of Lodz, the professional unions comprise 29.2 percent of all employees in the socialized economy, that is, approximately 120,000 individuals. This is already a considerable number, but it is no indication that the suspicion of the working class has been yet overcome.

It also occurs that the economic administration reluctantly or formally approaches the professional unions with the misconception that it can function without union organizations. Only an insignificant part of the technological cadre was enrolled in the union ranks.

It is the duty of the party to inspire activities aimed at implementing the economic and social goals outlined in the resolutions of the Ninth

Congress. Reform measures do not as yet exert a sufficiently effective influence on the course of economic progress. Raw materials and other materials continue to be wasted, and the degree of utilization of the nominal work period continues to be poor. The quality of manufactured goods is poor.

The year 1983 was favorable to the economy of our province, inasmuch as we have noted an 8.6 percent increase in sold production in industry. However, production volume is approximately 20 percent lower than in 1979, in conjunction with which the shrinking level of exports represents a disturbing phenomenon. In recent years the exports of four of our central agencies were reduced by one-half. Among other factors, this is the result of economic restrictions imposed by Western nations.

Special bonuses for work on free Saturdays, the hiring of pensioners and retirees, changes in the structure of employment as well as incentive systems introduced into certain plants produced the first anticipated results. Good work must be fairly and well remunerated, and to a large extent the discipline of work and its productivity depend on this.

The last 3 years were accompanied by a serious collapse in housing construction. In 1981, 7,254 apartments were planned for delivery. The plan was short of completion by 821 apartments, and in 1983 by 425. Employment in construction declined by 20.5 percent as compared with 1980. Labor productivity declined, there was a reduction in the utilization of equipment and production time, there are poor organizational structures and an inefficient administration system. The reform is not yet producing the results that it should. A report was prepared on the status of construction in our province containing a series of suggestions and proposals intended to improve the situation.

In the process of reforming the economy, the role of labor self-government will be intensified. There are self-government bodies now that espouse a mass of issues, manage to detect problems applicable to enterprises, prepare their own positions, reconcile public and factory matters. Together with party organizations and professional unions they have established the groundwork for cooperation.

Agriculture in our province, on the average, covers only 20 percent of the population's needs. This situation requires diligent efforts in creating a food-producing zone in the Lodz urban centers within the framework of the macroregion. Our most important problems relate to the development of storage and farm-food processing of potatoes, fruit and vegetables, milk. These undertakings, however, do not satisfy investment needs, especially in refrigeration, dairy farming and fruit-vegetable processing. We are pursuing many of these problems jointly with the United Peasant Party [ZSL].

Scientific and creative communities as well as supporters of culture should play a considerable role in resolving our difficult problems. Sound solutions prepared in scientific workshops and laboratories supporting the work of workers and the engineering-technological cadre, as well as those gained in practice, are the most reasonable way to overcome the crisis.

We expect greater ideological activity on the part of creative artist party members. We are in search of allies among non-party members. We cannot permit the exploitation of culture and art for the purpose of conducting a struggle with the socialist state and the party. An important objective in the development of culture is the attempt to expand participation of the working class in culture. We are assisting and we wish further to actively assist creative communities and supporters engaged in the dissemination of culture, in solving their professional and vital problems. We are supporting the initiative of new creative unions.

While sharing many valid, critical observations addressed to a series of offices, including the office of the city of Lodz, it is necessary to remember that our administration did not allow itself to fail and fall into disarray during a difficult period of time. Party organizations and echelons should maintain a critical attitude toward the administration, but should also assist it in resolving and settling numerous problems.

During discussions at party meetings, many critical observations are addressed to urban communication, trade and services, as well as the health service. We are aware that there is a shortage of goods, parts and materials. However, in solving these problems more mutual kindness and pertinacity are required.

The final portion of the report was devoted to the assumptions of the 40th anniversary celebrations of Polish People's Republic and the strategic assumptions of the Lodz party organization's program for the new administration, whose implementation should contribute to solutions to many social and political questions and bring about continued growth in the political activities of the PZPR Lodz organization.

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PARTY DAILY SUMMARIZES PZPR CONFERENCE RESULTS

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 21 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Anna Pawlowska]

[Text] A certain amount of time must pass to enable even the most attentive observer of the deliberations of the National Delegates' Conference to sort out his impressions and to fashion from them some kind of synthetic generalization. It is hard to believe that it was only 2 and 1/2 days, that the time was so compact, and that so few minutes devoid of content occurred in the discussion. This general impression already speaks well of the conference.

It is not a statutory obligation of the Central Committee to seek from the Delegates' Conference an acceptance vote of accounts or an expression of a vote of confidence; its term of office is a 5-year one, as is well known, and the congress is empowered to evaluate its work. I do not know if all of us accurately grasp the significance of this part of the resolution about fulfilling the resolutions of the Ninth Congress which contain a direct approval of the activities of the central authorities and the control organs for the Politburo and specifically for the first secretary of the Central Committee. In the recommendations of this document by the Resolutions and Motions Commission it is directly and unreservedly stated that in the party's reporting period its Politburo made decisions of the highest importance not provided for by the congress resolution.

In February 1982 the Politburo turned to the Central Committee during its Seventh Plenum and obtained approval of its conduct in the question of martial law. Already in March 1984 the entire Central Committee referred this whole issue to the delegates' plenum, which has a mandate to authorize the adjudication of the conformity or nonconformity of all decisions to the spirit of the Ninth Congress. The resolution was accepted without a single negative vote (but there were three abstentions). What occurred in the Congress Hall on the third day in the afternoon of deliberations is not a formality.

It is the broadest confirmation attainable within the party that the platform of the Ninth Congress was not contravened during these 33 unusually difficult

months. This element of the National Delegates' Conference should not escape anyone's attention.

Ideas

The climate of responsibility of the party not only for itself, not only for what happens within and outside of it, seems to me to be a characteristic aspect of the whole conference. This is because its deliberations accurately fit the trend of life in our country, general societal anxieties and hopes in matters of the greatest importance and in those seemingly insignificant. If I say that such an informed and freely-accepted feeling of responsibility for the country and for each part of it is a preliminary condition for the party's fulfillment of its managerial role in the state and its leadership role in society, I state an obvious reality; it is nevertheless a reality deserving of repetition.

Much attention was paid to the conference, both in the report of the Politburo and in the discussion about the link of the party with the proletariat, working people and society. As pointed out in the report, it is a central ideological problem for each workers' party, one of the basic sources of party strength. In our concrete, contemporary Polish conditions this link likewise has decisive importance on a somewhat different plane---it could be a very important element in achieving national understanding. I also found such a formulation of it in many statements at the conference. For this general concern for gaining for the organization's actions or party echelons understanding and recognition, and with time the participation of distrustful, suspect circles not cured of the bitterness of disappointment (and such circles are not lacking within the proletariat, as discussed by the proletariat-delegates is nothing other than the building of understandings. They thereby underscored that the way to these people leads exclusively through the creation of facts and not words.

Democratic centralism already seems to be a completely interparty matter, a binding agent of organizational homogeneity and party ideological unity. From the course of deliberations it is easy, however, to sense a tendency or desire to "carry these principles outside." This is in order to obtain--as so anticipated by wide sectors of society--a political rallying point fostered by the cell of the economic and state apparatus in various areas in order to enhance the execution of laws so that in public life the interests of the majority would prevail in a clash with those of narrow groups, in order to overcome the only seeming contradiction between citizens' freedoms and the competence of the state.

Marxism-Leninism is the ideology of the party, its compass and guide-post. Much was said during the conference about the need to expand knowledge of it among party members, to seek more effective forms of training and propaganda, and about the necessity of building up and strengthening the theoretical basis of the party. At the same time, however, in statements about the education and training of youth, about culture and the mass media, and about the ongoing political struggle the conviction appeared on a number of occasions that it is difficult to gain a civic attitude without

disseminating the principles of the system that people not possessing at least an elementary knowledge about socialism are the easiest target for antisocialist propaganda. Acquisition by the party of the skill of convincingly propagating among society at large the values of a materialistic system is an element for building socialism, which is as indispensable as economic and systemic changes; perhaps no one simply formulated it in this way, but such a postulate on this subject was read.

The question of social justice has for months become a vector of party activity and discussion; it was, of course, always present in the discussions at the conference, and in an "internally socialist" formulation--in the context of economic reform, on-the-spot principles, social policy of the state and in the antispeculation, antiparasite and antiparvenu theme. I desire to extract from this subject two detailed thoughts. First: a rather wide sphere of social protection is not perceived as just--with regard to women on child-care leave, to people benefitting from early retirements, and to young families with many children. People who work with the upbringing of children, working people who are the same age as their "early retire" colleagues, families who bring into the world children with thought and a feeling of responsibility consider this social protection to be an unearned privilege. Second: if something is drastically too small--for example, housing--social justice dictates a sharpening of the criteria of access, so therefore the housing policy should be considerably more stringent; each announced need should be scrutinized 10 times over. Both of these thoughts seem to prove how simplistic is the vision that Poland, freed from Polonia firms, would consequently become a land of universal justice....

Consciousness that we are not an isolated island on the sea of the contemporary world was reflected in many statements: how Western restrictions additionally deepened the production difficulties of particular institutions how destructive was the influence of imperialistic broadcasts in the Polish language, what earnest voices the representatives of the western and northern provinces [of Poland] directed against another wave of West German revisionism, and in the cited examples of fruitful economic cooperation with socialist countries. This theme was crowned with two unanimously-approved conference documents: an appeal in the matter of defending peace and a message to all communist and workers' parties.

Issues

If someone wanted to attempt the compilation of all the contemporary issues the conference considered, that individual would have to fill up a large book. Certainly an issue that attracted the most attention is economic reform considered in its various aspects. Again I can only permit myself to discuss three of them. The fate of the reform understood not only as an organizational-economic move but also as a term reaching the consciousness of producers is currently being decided; the reform, moreover, will reach the working post by means of a system of payments. In the statements of these people, deeply and sincerely engaged in the success of reform, there were, however, few reclamatory notes, although representatives of the professions and of poorly-paid trades were not lacking among those

participating in the discussions. There was another postulate: that this system be clear, legible for the worker, based on criteria in accord with his concept of justice. Secondly, there was anxiety stemming from the aging permanent capital of institutions, from the growing technological gap separating us from the world and from our closest neighbors, anxiety about one's own workplace. Thirdly, there was a consciousness that the reform is the highest stake in the struggle to get out of the crisis, that it is surrounded by many threats--bureaucratic, conservative, but also objective--stemming from the sparing state of the economy and that it is necessary to meet these threats head on; in addition, party effort is needed for the growth of labor productivity.

The conference placed the issue of youth in the range of one of its most important problems. This included young people in the party, but above all in Poland; these young people whom--as accurately stated by one of the discussants--"we cannot replace with any other." If somewhere the feeling of divergence between intentions and decisions of the party and accomplished results was felt, it was precisely here, not only in the question of our inefficiency or lack of patience, not only the fault of objective circumstances and difficulties of beginning life in crisis conditions, but also because the young generation undoubtedly constitutes at present the main area of encounter with the political opponent. There was, however, no discussion about the mood of helplessness or--even less--the desire of abandoning this field to anyone. Among other things an appeal was made to the state authorities to defend the lay character of the school system.

Elections to the people's councils were an issue seen in all of its import. Besides the accurate selection of candidates for councilors, besides the real but imaginatively created election programs, the crowning election argument should be the fairly assessed accomplishments of the 40-year-old Polish People's Republic, which is not the contribution or the property of the party, but is the fruit of the great labor of the nation, a national legitimation in the face of the past and of the future. A special resolution about the tasks of the party in the elections passed by the conference is a document containing only the obligations of party members, since in the election campaign they have civil rights and intensive political duties shared with all of their fellow citizens.

People

The conference is not only ideas and issues. It is also people, delegates, the same ones who were there 2 and 1/2 years ago, equal as then, different in age, social milieu, profession, education and party training. But this is already another matter: not pained, exasperated, suspect, vibrating with whispered and shouted slander, not vacillating between truth and falsehood, bellowing in superhuman labor each clear thought, each step forward. At that time these same people gathered in order to save the party, its unity, its honor, its place in the nation.

Today they are a single entity--far from schematic uniformity, presenting in many matters views that are different and even sometimes sharply critical

of one another. Expressed thoughts, proposed motions, formulated opinions have a clearly felt common current. Today these delegates have gathered in order to evaluate together the road already traveled and to look at what they have to do together.

On this rocky road which the party has traveled since the Ninth Congress, the party collectivity again found itself composed of people united by one idea and one goal. The passage of time here was not any miracle worker. The strenuous incorporation into life of the decisions and resolutions of the Ninth Congress allowed the party people to find a link without which the party cannot be itself and cannot accomplish anything.

As in the days of the congress, so also during the conference the meeting hall was a picture of the party as it was and as it is.

During the conference much was said about the attitudes of party members, about something that can be termed "party character". It also began to be formed anew on this post-congress road. It is not an accident that the delegates with spontaneous applause interrupted the final appearance of the first secretary after the words: "We do not need in the party excessively polite people counting on arrangements and a badly understood career." There was talk of civilian courage, good will toward people, honesty at work as an indispensable characteristic of party membership. The report of the Politburo contained a sentence about assets, leaders and people recommended for positions: "The party demands many virtues from those in whom it has placed its trust. Above all, however, it demands honesty, modesty, objectivity in the service of the party. No one is excused on account of demoralization."

This same report said--and this was published, so it is a matter of public record--that in the questionnaire circulated among the delegates immediately before the conference "more than one-third of our comrades expressed the view that the realization of the resolution of the Ninth Congress is insufficiently consistent."

As a result of this survey one could pass to the order of the day, one could pass over this statement in publication.....This was not done. The party demands honesty of those in whom it has placed its trust. It wants to and is able to be honest with regard to society, whose confidence it seeks. The assessment of the realization of the congress decisions by the delegates --appearing both in this questionnaire and in the conference itself--is a victory for the feeling of responsibility for the awareness of accomplishments, which are unquestionable, valuable and have brought satisfaction, something the delegates did not hide.

Before the party, before all of us, there are the next 30-odd months until the 10th Congress. This is very little time in which to accomplish so much that remains for us to do. But at the same time we will be looking further, working--in accordance with the position of the conference--on the draft of the perspective program of the party, a party conscious of its responsibility not only for itself.

SOCIOPOLITICAL IMPACT OF SHIPYARD WORKERS STRIKES EXAMINED

Warsaw STUDIA SOCIOLOGICZNE in Polish No 4, Apr 84 pp 53-72

[Article by Teresa J. Makowska and Lucjan Adamczuk: "Workers in Two Disputes"]

[Text] Port-services and marine-commerce are the dominating functions in the economy of the Szczecin region¹, thus the mainstays of the economy are the port, navigation, sea fishery and the shipyards. The enterprises in this sector employ about one-third of the workers in socialized industry and transportation. These enterprises, in view of the number of employed, rank with the two largest categories of enterprises (according to the GUS [Main Statistical Office] classification). These are objective determinants of their standing in the city and in the region.

The characteristic feature of the economic map of the region is the concentration of industry and the entire marine economy along the axis of the Oder [River], with the central point in the provincial capital. It delineates the geographic limits of the concentration of the working class (approximately 70 percent of those employed in industry). It is there on the Oder that the largest plant in the area is located, the A. Warski Shipyard in Szczecin, with two overhaul shipyards and the port nearby, and somewhat farther away, the "Szczecin" Steelworks, the "Skolwin" Paper Factory, and the "Police" Chemical Plants. Because of this location, the Warski Shipyard is a convenient point of contact for the entire industrial district.

The shipyards--production and overhaul--employ almost 20,000 people. Their city-building role is very clearly seen in the steady growth of share in employment and in industrial production. In 1970, every 17th actively-employed Szczecin resident worked in the shipbuilding industry,² and if the family is included, every sixth or seventh inhabitant of Szczecin is connected with the shipbuilding industry. From this standpoint alone, therefore, this is an important socio-occupational group in the city. But the importance of shipyard workers as a socio-occupational category does not stem just from their numbers. This group has an education that is higher than the average in the city. A similar comparison with the national average also shows that the shipyard workers are above the average.³ The shipyard workers are also distinct as a vocational group due to the young age of the workforce, and along with this is the greater dynamism of behavior and the insignificant percentage of women among the workers.⁴

The importance of the shipbuilding industry to the city and the region is a fact which has been advertised in the local mass media for many years, and every inhabitant is aware of it. It is well known, for example, that the Warski Shipyard has helped directly in the expansion of the city's municipal infrastructure. And its very location makes the city feel its presence, which cannot be said about a port hidden in a mesh of inter-Oder canals. The city inhabitants have close personal contacts with the shipyards through their participation in ship-launching ceremonies.

These facts reflect in the attitudes of the city's inhabitants. They look upon the shipyards, and particularly on the Warski Shipyard, with pride, and regard its workforce as leader of public opinion. The shipyard workers filled this role very well twice in the past 10 years when they came out as the initiators and organizers of an open public protest.

It is the purpose of this report to show the role and significance of the shipyard workers in the strikes that took place on the Szczecin Coast. And the fact that this could not have been a small role is shown by their high participation, by percentage, in the higher (outside the shipyards) strike structure in 1980: they made up 83 percent of the personnel in the ranks and 65 percent of its presidium.

The Initiative Role of the Shipyard Workers in the Strikes

Both the 1970-1971 Szczecin Revolt,⁵ and the August strike in 1980 were begun by shipyard workers, or to put it more precisely, but that part of the workforce which was always the instigating force in these events.

In December 1970 the initiative for open protest came from the Warski Shipyard workforce in Szczecin. Let us very briefly recall the sequence of events: on Thursday, the 17th, during the morning coffee break (10 a.m.) the workforce rallied spontaneously. Some of its participants formed a protest march into the city and, as we know, this not only led to an encounter with the forces of law and order but it also spread the news throughout the city about the workers' protest. Without delving into reasons, we know that the next day when the Warski workforce decided to announce a sit-in strike, it already had the support of the overhaul shipyard and the workforces of the largest plants in the city.⁶

In January 1971 events followed a similar scenario: a rally in the Warski Shipyard, announcement of a sit-in strike, and then expansion of the strike to other workplaces in the city. All of the larger workplaces in the city supported the shipyard workers, e.g., the city transportation workers declared a strike and there were no streetcars or buses on the streets of Szczecin.

In June 1976 the shipyard workers held a rally which lasted several hours, but did not go beyond the gates of the home plant. They did not give the signal for an organized protest, thus no one in the city supported the 1-day strike by the workers in the Dolna Odra [Lower Oder] Power Plant.

The wave of dissatisfaction which spread through various areas of the country in 1980 reached the Coast in mid-August. It revealed itself in an open protest, again initiated by the shipyard workers. In Szczecin this took place on Monday, the 18th. The workers in the "Parnica" Overhaul Shipyard (about 800 employees) were the first to announce a strike. Knowing that in Szczecin no campaign can be successful if it is not supported by the Warski workforce, the Parnica strikers immediately sent their representatives to Warski. They got there just at the moment that the workforce was organizing itself and forming a strike structure. It may be said that "the city was waiting" for just such a reaction. News about the strikes came in from outside the city and the East Coast was struck for 4 days. The local press had reported for some time about work stoppages, but had not yet used the word "strike".⁸ In this social climate the news that Warski is on strike spread like wildfire, and was received with the words "it has begun", i.e., not as a surprise but as something which was inevitable.⁹ And that this was simply like a waiting for a signal was shown by the facts: already during the first day the strike spread to 22 of the larger plants, including all of the shipyards and the port, and that immediately a supra-factory strike organization was formed. The workers who joined the strike or began a solidarity campaign did so as an act of support for the shipyard workers, which was demonstrated by displaying the appropriate slogans. When the workers were asked why they had announced a strike, they gave solidarity with the shipyard workers as the reason.¹⁰

This longest (for it lasted 13 days) strike was already the third multiplant strike in the city initiated by shipyard workers.

The Role of the Shipyard Workers in the Formation of Strike Organizations

When the Warski Shipyard workers declared a sit-in strike in December 1970 they had to form an organizational structure. They had to do this themselves because they could not count on the help of the union organization, which, during the dispute, found itself on the opposing side. And at that time there was no past experience to draw on, nor were there any organizational examples that could be followed. It was the solutions worked out in the winter of 1970-1971 in the Warski Shipyards that were to become the model for the future strikes, both by Warski and other workplaces.

The lack of knowledge and experience on how to organize a strike meant that the spontaneity of the protest behavior of the workers during the first strike (December) lasted an entire 24 hours. Deductions were drawn very quickly from that experience, because in the second, January, strike, an organization was formed in a couple of hours, which at that time surprised the administration of the Warski Shipyard.

In August 1980 the spontaneous behavior occurred only during the phase when the idea of proclaiming a strike began to form and ripen among the workforce. The workers knew that all protest actions must be undertaken as an organized group. Hence the elements of organized activity began to appear already in the strike-proclamation phase; organizational structures were appointed and demands were listed. The political and economic leadership of the enterprises, as representatives of the central authorities, had to deal, therefore, with an organized workforce and not with a mob.¹¹

The Warski workforce, in forming its own organizational structures in 1970 for the period of the strike, followed the official organizational structure of the enterprise. Its basic element was the "strike trio"--the lowest element of authority, and also the representative body of the workers of the particular organizational units (departments). The "trios" were elected at workers' meetings in open elections. The authority of the "trios" covered all matters of organization and order in the home unit organizations and was recognized by its official leadership. Fundamental decisions on strike demands, negotiation with authorities, and continuation of the strike, were made democratically at general meetings of the strikers. The position of the workers' groups was represented at the general meetings by representatives of all organizational units of the "strike trio", which jointly made up a specific kind of parliament of the striking workers.

The central executive authority of the strikers was a strike committee headed by a chairman elected at a general meeting of the "strike trios". Within the framework of the general tasks of the strike committee the following matters were selected for which individual committee members or groups of persons were responsible:

- negotiation with the authorities (conducted by a 6-man group),
- propaganda and radio-network service,
- information and communication,
- food and lodging,
- medical care,
- plant security (guards and sentries),
- secretariat and outside communication.

The committee availed itself of the assistance of competent persons; persons not part of the strike leadership. This was the beginning of the institution of an "expert"--an adviser, so important in the work of the strike committees in August 1980.¹²

Officially in 1970 there was no joint, supra-factory strike leadership. The 19 December appeal to the inhabitants of the city was made by "strike committees located in the A. Warski Shipyard in Szczecin," and the strike demands were signed by strike committees in three plants (Warski Shipyard, which also represented the workforces of the outside firms doing work on the premises of the shipyard, the Shipbuilding Construction Research Center, and the Szczecin Overhaul Shipyard "Gryfia"). However, talks with local political and administrative authorities were conducted by representatives of the strike committees of the two shipyards--Warski and Gryfia. In the minutes of these talks they are listed by name as "workforce representatives" and they signed the protocol as such.

As a matter of fact, the striking workforces cooperated with each other, and on the outside the representatives of the strike committees mentioned represented not just themselves, which the local authorities at that time had to acknowledge. The following entry in the minutes attests to this:

"Many workplaces represented by their own people reported to the Szczecin Shipyard with problems similar to those taken up by the Szczecin A. Warski Shipyard workforce and the workforce of the Szczecin Overhaul Shipyard. In the case of these workforces it is recognized that if on the premises of these plants no losses were caused outside the losses caused by interruptions in work in connection with the strike, the same agreements will be binding as accepted for both shipyards."

The organizational structures during the January strike (1971) did not differ basically from those developed in December 1970. The expansion of the authority-representing body in organizational units from three to five persons was one of the significant changes. This made it possible to extend the make-up of the strike committee to represent all organizational units, because out of each of the "striking five" one person was delegated to the factory strike committee. What was formed, therefore, was something of a two-chambered central strike authority, i.e., a general meeting of "striking fives"--something on the order of a chamber of representatives--and a strike committee, which can be regarded as a counterpart to a senate. The scope of decision-making of both authorities differed: strategic decisions belonged to the general representational meeting, while tactics and operations were the domain of the strike committee. The defect in this solution was that it ignored the principle of proportionality, as a result of which the smallest organizational unit was able to exert the same amount of influence on a decision as the largest. The advantage of this solution was the ease with which contact could be maintained between the strike committee and the entire striking workforce of the enterprise.

During the January strike a group of persons formed within the strike committee who performed a leading role in operational and tactical matters--something on the order of a presidium, although that term was not being used at that time. Such a body was not formally set up until the strike in 1980. During this strike, just as in December 1970, despite the fact that in Warski there were representatives of striking workforces from the Szczecin area and that there actually existed a strike center of interfactory authority, this time, too, there was no official establishment of a supra-factory strike organization. Although, as a result of pressure from these workforces, the possibility, and even the necessity, of forming a city strike committee began to appear.¹³ The blockade of the Warski Shipyard, applied by the authorities, made such an idea unrealistic. And the shipyard strike committee performed this function unofficially to the end.

The Warski Shipyard workers, in organizing their own organizations during the strike in 1980, referred to the solutions developed in 1970 and 1971 in everything. As organizers of the supra-factory organ of strike authority (because already in the first hours of the strike it transformed itself into the Interfactory Strike Committee), they brought their own solutions into this forum.

One can speak of a duplication of strike organizational structures in the Warski Shipyard on the interfactory level. On the same basis that the shipyard "strike trios" in the departments were formed, representations of factory workforces joining the joint strike organization were formed. That is how the general assembly of strike delegates was formed, a body made up of delegates of striking workforces and representatives of the inside organizational units in the Warski Shipyard. They made the decisions in the most important matters, decisions that were always made after consultation with the workforces of the home organizational units. This procedure weakened the efficiency with which action was taken, but it had a great advantage--the decisions that were made had the broad public support of the strikers and thus there could be no accusation that they do not represent the strikers' position, but only the position of the strike leadership.

In 1980 two-level leadership organs were already operating on an official basis: the strike committee plenum and its immediate leadership, officially called a presidium. This did not diminish the decisionmaking range of the delegates. The general assembly of delegates from the striking workforces, following the 1971 example, retained the right to decide whether the strike was to be continued or stopped, and to negotiate demands. The interfactory executive strike organ, however, just as in the previous strikes, retained jurisdiction over operations and tactics, but even here the constant presence of the delegates forced the central strike leadership to address itself to the desires of the "striking masses".

The 1970-1971 solutions were employed not only in the Warski Shipyard and in the formation of supra-factory organizations, the workforces of other striking factories followed the same examples.¹⁴

In order that the strike be conducted efficiently, the committees organized various specialized services, as needs dictated. These followed the proven examples of the two previous strikes. As in 1970, a workers' unit to maintain order was formed, a social supply service, and a unit responsible for communication and information. The range of activities of these services expanded greatly in comparison with the first and second strike.¹⁵ This was particularly true in relation to the order-maintenance and informational services. For example, in Warski Shipyard the workers' order-maintenance guard even controlled the pedestrian and vehicle traffic in the area of the plant. This was necessary due to the absence of militia traffic patrols to control the increased traffic during the entire period of the strike.

A very important condition for continuation of the strike was the ability to bring in supplies of food for the strikers. Although the families of the strikers, as well as nonrelatives but people in solidarity with the strikers, brought in food, the problem of food supply was solved by appointing supply-service units. They were much larger than those in 1970 and were able to operate more easily. The broad range of the strikes and the solidarity actions in Szczecin also encompassed the workforces of food-supply enterprises, and thus the factories, and particularly the supply services in the Warski Shipyard, availed themselves of their assistance. In August 1980 it would have been incomparably more difficult to deprive the strikers of food than in December 1970. It would probably have required a food-supply blockade of the entire city.¹⁶

It was not difficult to provide the strikers with medical care. The large majority of the health service agencies in Szczecin were in sympathy with the strikers.¹⁷ And in the Warski Shipyard, just as in December 1970, the Plant Health Service was on duty around the clock.

During the August strike the problem of information was solved more easily than during the two previous strikes. The quickly organized information and communication network covered all of the striking workforces, and, indirectly, the entire "city". This was possible because the basic form of mass communication was by transmission through the shipyard radio, which, in view of the use of outdoor loudspeakers, took in the "city."

In December 1970 the striking shipyard workers only printed an appeal to the inhabitants of Szczecin, but in August 1980, bulletins were published. The Interfactory Strike Committee issued four editions of the "Jednosc" [Unity] information bulletin. Following the example of the shipyard workers, the workforces at other plants issued their own strike bulletins, e.g., the streetcar workers.

In comparison with the 1970-1971 Szczecin Revolt, the liaison, or communication, between the strike headquarters and the strikers was more expanded. This form of communication was possible because the authorities in 1980 did not restrict the freedom of movement between plants and the strike headquarters. During the entire period of the strike, telephone communication was also used. There was no communication with the Tri-City [Gdansk, Sopot, Gdynia] only during the first week of the strike.

Free access to all to the Warski Shipyard made it possible during this strike to introduce a new means of information dissemination--an "announcement board", which was a brick wall at the main gate. A large-scale, graphic presentation of the strike demands was published on this board. This has to be regarded as an extremely successful measure, because the entire "city" copied what was written there.

Including the "city" in the reach of the propaganda and publicizing the supporting actions expanded the strike's public base.¹⁹ This was undoubtedly an important tactical operation. In this way the headquarters ensured that the strikers were not isolated from the "city", and it also effectively counteracted disinformation spread to the people by the official mass media. In the previous strikes the conditions were not present for such broad dissemination of information, even though the strike committees attached no less importance than in August 1980 to ensuring for themselves the ability to inform society about the real demands and postulates of the striking workforces. This was of incredible importance to the strikers in a situation in which the authorities conducted a psychological war against them. Public opinion and the local community had a lively interest in the demands of the shipyard workers, hence in every strike the demand that the strike postulates be published and the consistent rejection of this demand, followed instead by a biased report on the strike postulates in the mass media. Everyone still vividly remembered the winter of 1970-1971 when the press, radio and television gave a distorted picture of the strikes. It must be said that in August 1980 the local mass media showed much more restraint in their expressions of opinion on the strikers.

It should not be ruled out that this was due, among other things, to the generally demonstrated solidarity of the residents with the strikers, and that such a general acceptance of the strike would not have been possible if the shipyard workers had not been able to quickly and widely disseminate the information about what they were fighting for.

Precisely, about what and in behalf of whom did the shipyard workers go out in the strikes the followed?

Articulation of Interests

From the sociological viewpoint it is extremely interesting to know who and in behalf of whose interests appeared in the events that followed in Szczecin.

In the sociopolitical practice in effect in our country, the articulation of the interests of the workforces as well as the entire working class is the responsibility of the leadership of the Polish United Workers Party. It establishes the program, defines the goals which assumedly constitute a concretization of the interests of the "working people of the cities and the countryside"; the successive implementations of the goals, meanwhile, are stages in the process of the implementation of their overall interests.²⁰

If we agree that the establishment of the goals of social policy was taken away from the rank-and-file member of the working community by the formation of "echelons which ascribe to the interested what their interest should be from the standpoint of the system of values recognized by the spokesmen for these echelons",²¹ then the unconformities of such articulated interests with the strivings of the working people had to come to light. And thus the rank-and-file workers had to question, every so often--1956, 1970, 1976, 1980--the established goals of socioeconomic policy as goals that do not actually conform with the workers' interests, as goals which under the current conditions in which they are living do not give proper consideration to their needs and desires.

Three times, as we wrote, the shipyard workers were the first to protest against such articulation of workers' interests. In 1970 they came out with a 21-point list of demands, in 1971 with 12 demands, and in 1980 with a 36-point list covering 38 demands.²² In each case the demands which the workforces of various plants acknowledged to be theirs and declared their support for were formulated in the Szczecin A. Warski Shipyard. Thus it was established that the workforce of this shipyard takes upon itself the obligation of articulating not just its interests alone. Such an arrangement was recognized as natural by other plants in the region. The situation which led to the articulation of interests in the form of written demands favored this arrangement. It was determined by two factors: the first stemmed from the fact that the formulation of demands always occurred in a state of overall social tension and the generation, therefore, of a rather uniform in its substance and scope public opinion. And the second was the spontaneity of strike initiatives reducing the possibility of consultation between plants before the demands were formulated and listed. During all three strikes, the content and the speed with which the strike demands were formulated was the most important factor in consolidating the workforce towards the idea of a strike.

The strike demands always describe the nature and goals of the protest. The slogans expressed are a factor which integrates all of those who agree that the ideas they contain are right, and makes a cohesive, purposeful group out of a loose collective.²³ That is why it is important, immediately in the first phase of the strike, to quickly and accurately formulate demands that are universally approved, i.e., to clearly answer the question, "what are we fighting for?". The role of the strike committee in each case is to make a selection and a generalization of the demands that are spontaneously flowing in, on the one hand, and on the other hand to convince those making the proposals that such measures are indispensable. This task is extremely important, since the gist and the form of the demands frequently predetermine whether or not they can be won in a negotiation. But it also serves as a representation of the strikers for all of society and history. And just as it is important to formulate the strike demands quickly and accurately, it is equally important to quickly and widely disseminate them, because the strength of the workers' support and the range of the strike's reach depends on these conditions.

The shipyard workers did well in all of these actions in all three strikes, and especially in the August strike. In this strike the joint list of demands was signed by 285 workforces, and 144 of these declared a sit-in strike in support.²⁴ The solid position of the workforces meant that the attempts by the authorities to conduct separate negotiations with individual workforces failed.

From the standpoint of a sociological analysis, not only are the content and the form of the demands important, but also the way in which they are expressed. Hence several comments on this subject. In each of the three strikes the method of formulating the demands was different, although there were also certain common features, especially between the first and the third strikes. The first slogans and demands were jointly formed at the spontaneous rallies, from which each strike began. These rallies performed the function of a gathering place and made it possible for those assembled to mutually assure themselves that there was unity of thinking or similarity of viewpoints on the most important goals of the strike. The realization that there was a similarity or a commonality of goals transformed the rallying human "aggregate" into a collective welded by the striving to implement these goals.²⁵ Their public, immediate expression was preliminary to the formulation of demands in written form, which was done already within the framework of the strike organizational structures. In August 1980 they were formulated in the Warski Shipyard, with the participation of delegates from the Parnica Shipyard.

The method of formulating demands in the second strike (January 1971) was different. The demands of this strike in their basic form were formulated by one of the advisers and then accepted and supplemented by the workforces of the departments in the shipyard and, with the approval of the workforces of other plants, became the basis for negotiations with the authorities. This difference was due to the distinctly defensive character of the January strike, which was also reflected in the text of the demands.

A general analysis of the gist of the demands of the three successive strikes shows, on the one hand, the development of the social awareness of the Warski

workforce, their principal author, and, on the other hand, what kind of slogans the workforces of the Szczecin plants espoused when they joined in the strike, i.e., what common or similar interests the shipyard workers articulated.

Assuming, according to a subject criterion of the range of demands, a stipulated division of demands into four groups--demands covering all aspects of political life, economic demands, social and societal demands, and protective and settlement demands (the latter could well be included in the political demands), we obtain the following picture:

<u>Nature of Demands</u>	<u>Number of Demands in Successive Strikes</u>		
	<u>I</u> <u>(1970)</u>	<u>II</u> <u>(1971)</u>	<u>III</u> <u>(1980)</u>
Protective and settlement demands	8	7	6
Political (all aspects) demands	7	4	11
Social and societal demands	3	-	10
Economic demands	2	1	9

In the first strike the political-demands group began with two: withdrawal of the Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ) and formation of independent trade unions; next it was demanded that those responsible for the economic crisis and the use of weapons against workers be punished; it was demanded that the truth be told about the country's economic and political situation; and it was demanded also that the deputies in the representative authority come out in defense of the interests of their electors.

Half of the protective demands concerned immediate protection of the strikers (guarantee of personal safety, payment of wages for period of strike, removal of the telecommunication blockade, and publishing of demands in the mass media).

On social and societal matters, the demands included an equalization of the earnings of the party apparatus with the average wages paid in industry and the elimination of other privileges for the ruling apparatus, fair distribution of housing, reduction of bureaucracy.

Only two demands were of an economic nature: the first pertained to a withdrawal of the price increases instituted on 12 December 1970, and in the other a wage increase of 30 percent was demanded.

In order to properly assess the workers' demands in the first strike, we must internalize the political situation in which they occurred: just for the right to formulate them the highest price had already been paid, the price of blood.²⁶ And then it must be agreed that the gist of the workers' demands in December proves not only courage and determination in the struggle for goals going beyond narrow group interests, but it is, above all, proof of the social and political maturity of the working class, rising above the rancor, resentment and insult to dignity, of which little was spared at that time. Of the 21 workers' demands there was not even one which could have been regarded as anarchistic, undermining the political system, or leading to a weakening of authority.

During the second (January) strike, most of the demands (seven of them) were of a definitely protective nature. They stemmed from a sense of threat and a search for effective protection against the lawlessness of the administrative, social and political authorities, and here they had a political quality (three demands). It was envisaged that such protection can be obtained when the discredited, by their passivity, activists in the party, union and youth organizations are replaced. This demand did not go beyond the plant level. It was assumed that when such a replacement, made under the supervision of the strikers while maintaining all of the past not-very democratic principles, is complete, it will be possible to bring into authority people who were active in the strike structures in December 1970. New people in the old structures were to serve as a guarantee that the workers' interests would be better represented, and also as a guarantee of protection for all those who struck. The period which had elapsed since the end of the December strike did not presage any changes in the worker-authority relations. The belief that this is a "renewal in the old way"²⁷ became more and more engrained. And still the mass media, heedless of the moods of the workforces, increased their propaganda intended to show the workers' full support for the new party leadership.

In the protective-settlement group of demands there were two (just as in December) demands for immediate protection for the strikers and two demands of a settlement nature, regarded as a warning for the authorities. They pertained to determining and punishing those guilty of provoking the strike and correcting the biased information that had been published in the newspapers.²⁸

Of the 12 demands submitted at that time, only one dealt with economics--this was the demand that retail prices on food products be reduced to the prices in effect before 12 December 1970.

The demands formulated in August 1980 include most of those made in December 1970. Many of them are repeated almost word for word.

In all three strikes the demands for immediate protection to strikers repeat themselves, that is, a guarantee of personal safety, particularly to members of the strike committees, payment of wages for the strike period, and publication of the demands in the mass media.

The following demands are repeated in the group dealing with political affairs: the formation of independent trade unions, punishment for those guilty of permitting the crisis in the country to arise, and in the future, issuance of truthful information to the people about the country's socioeconomic situation. The demand calling for "the formation of free and independent, (of the party and the government) trade unions" headed the list of demands in the first and third strikes. But it must be emphasized that the weight of this demand in both strikes was different and stemmed from the experience gained in the Szczecin Revolt. Implementation of the demands of the first and second strike in relation to trade unions showed that they were unreformable both from the standpoint of function and from the standpoint of the personnel structure of the authorities. Because of this, in the third strike the demand about free unions appeared in the form of an ultimatum, as the main goal of the strike.

On political issues, new in comparison to the previous strikes, the following demands were made:

--that the strike be recognized as a legal form of workers' protest in our sociopolitical system,

--that the Human Rights Charter drawn up at the Helsinki Conference be disseminated,

--that persecution of oppositionists be ceased and that it be made possible for new sociopolitical groups to be constituted,

--that censorship be abolished,

--that there be full freedom for the work of the Catholic Church and that a mass be broadcast on radio and television,

--that the elected organs be limited to two terms of office,

--that the practice of transferring workers who are not performing their duties satisfactorily to management positions on the same level be discontinued,

--that "prestige-type" expenditures, which the country cannot afford at present, be discontinued (assistance to the Third World and Hermaszewski's flight in space were given as examples).

Even this cursory analysis of the demands shows that they articulate interests not only from the position of the worker, but the citizen. This is characteristic of the December and August demands in Szczecin. It should be noted that the demand that terms of office be limited to two and that the policy of transferring incompetent personnel to lateral positions, commonly referred to as "the director's carousel," be discontinued constitutes opposition to the entrenchment in our system of management teams which, although the results of their activities are not approved by the governed, could not be removed, thus creating an obstacle on the road to change. We think that it was precisely this kind of formulation of demands and no other that ensured such wide approval of the shipyard workers' protest by various social circles.

In all three strikes the purely economic (wage) demands were not among the most important, although it should be mentioned here that during the first and second strike deliberate attempts were made to present the strike as being of a strictly economic nature, despite the fact that the text of the demands contradicted this. This was, to a large degree, a defense reflex caused by the authorities' strong desire to classify the strikes as political events which were in violation of the law and also the political system, thus inimical and damaging to the national interest.

In the August strike, the demands raising social and societal matters were more extensive, as compared with the previous strikes. The fact that the demands made in 1970 concerning the elimination of social privileges for the government apparatus were repeated deserves attention. Of the new demands (6),

the majority (4) expressed broad social-welfare needs of all working people. And this quality of the demands--that they represented the interests of the widest circles of society, including annuitants and pensioners--ensured spontaneous and mass support.

Proof of how accurately--in the public's perception--the shipyard workers articulated their demands is the extent of the support. Private individuals, representatives of different professions and organizations, and even soldiers, came to the strike headquarters with expressions of approval, donations of money for the free trade-union fund (in August in 4 days over 4 million zlotys was collected), and by other symbolic gestures showed their solidarity with the strikers.²⁹

The Struggle for Acceptance of the Strike Demands

Another issue which requires illumination and study, also from the standpoint of social psychology, is the proceedings, organization and technique of negotiation. There is a great deal of scattered material in this field which must be assembled and carefully prepared. In each strike the negotiations proceeded differently and a description of them gives a picture of accumulated experience and skill on the part of the workforces.

During the December strike, three rounds of talks with the authorities took place, in which the Warski Shipyard and the Gryfia Repair Yard were represented by six representatives each. The talks were held off the premises of the shipyard and were surrounded by total secrecy (at the demand of the authorities). They were concluded with the signing of a protocol, whose integral part are the "Final Decisions", which are the result of the discussion on the list of workers' demands. The signatures of both negotiating sides appear under the document. The "Final Decisions" embody the joint position of both sides on 17 demands. The document does not cover the rejected demands, i.e.:

- release of those arrested during incidents with the strikers,
- noninterference of the armed forces in the workplaces,
- parity of earnings of employees in the party apparatus and the average wages of workers in industry,
- elimination of reduced prices for meals in cafeterias operated for the Citizens Militia and the PZPR Provincial Committees.

Five demands of a protective and social nature were dealt with favorably: care of families of those killed, pay for the duration of the strike, protection of the strikers, an increase in housing construction, and a reduction in bureaucracy.

Twelve decisions, including all of the political and economic ones, are recorded in the document as compromises, although in an almost negative sense. The authorities agreed only that it was appropriate to send to Warsaw the demands that the trade unions better represent the interests of the working class and the discredited activists of the trade unions be dismissed from their positions, and the demand for wage increases with a 3-day deadline for implementation.

The extension of the "Final Decisions" to all workforces striking in Szczecin should be regarded as an indisputable victory for the negotiating strikers.

The accepted technique for the talks in the first strike and the location at which they were conducted did not favor the strikers, which undoubtedly had an influence on their results. The group of negotiators representing the strikers was cut off from direct contact with the workforces during the period of the talks and deprived of their support, and most of all, had no organizational experience, which in view of the enormous responsibility for the results of the talks meant that the authorities could shape physical and mental negotiating conditions that were favorable to themselves.³⁰

The results of these talks were not accepted unequivocally by the striking workers; they felt that they did not fulfill, to a satisfactory degree, their demands. The result was that the strike was continued. The strike was called off only when the shipyard was completely blockaded and the workers were exhausted.

In the second strike, i.e., a month after the first, the Warski Shipyard workers already had the benefit of their experience from the manner in which the talks were held in December 1970. The conclusions drawn from that strike indicated that talks with authorities should be conducted only in the headquarters of the striking workforce and in the presence of the entire strike committee, and best of all, publicly, in the presence of the entire workforce. This was done for the first time during the January strike in 1971. The authorities, this time a team from the top level, came to the strikers for the talks, and as a result not so much of negotiation as of public talks (broadcast by the plant's radio station), the decisions were made which constituted the reply to the 12-point list of workers' demands. The erstwhile party first secretary deemed that 10 of the demands were suitable for implementation and rejected two of them (on retraction of the price increases and on public announcement of the workers' demands). From the standpoint of the original, main goals of the strike, envisaging replacement of the personnel in the party and union leadership at the plant level, everything was achieved which would make this strike a victory. But the future would show that this was not a lasting or fruitful victory for the workers' interests.

The organization of the negotiations in the third strike (August) was another step forward and eliminated the unfavorable conditions which existed in the first and second strikes. In 1980 the initiative during the talks, and control over their proceedings, was totally in the hands of the strike headquarters. The success of the January strike meant that 10 years later there was no doubt either among the strikers or among the representatives of the authorities that the talks must take place on the premises of the strike headquarters. Nor was there any doubt that the results of the talks must be made public, that they must be accurately recorded, and that every word in the decisions accepted is important. Thanks to the development of the institution of advisers and experts, begun in the second strike, no rhetorical, ambiguous or actually propagandistic phrases appeared in the final decisions, but expressions that were too general were not avoided, and in the future this allowed both sides to interpret them differently.

During the August strike the negotiations with the authorities in behalf of the strikers were conducted by the interfactory strike committee. Part of the negotiations were conducted in the presence of the entire group of strike delegates and were broadcast by the shipyard's radio station, which made them public. This method of conducting talks with the government commission created a situation which was favorable to the negotiators representing the strikers. The hosts of the talks, the Warski workforce, frequently pointed out to the government commission that the position that they were taking in the negotiations had the full support of not only the strikers but also the broad, local community. This was done by reading appropriate parts of letters from the public at the opening of each round of talks. But the plenary, publicly conducted talks turned out to be not very effective. As soon as a mixed, editorial team was formed, a distinct progress in the negotiations was observed. This team took upon itself the entire burden of working out the compromise decisions in relation to the individual demands, and constituted something like a counterpart to the negotiating group from the period of the first strike. Because the strike delegates wanted to prevent a possible lessening of the influence of the broad striking masses on the tenor of the final decisions, they reserved unto themselves the right to approve the decisions as written by the editorial team.

In view of the strikers' resolute position and the unwillingness of the government commission to yield on basic questions, the talks conducted in this manner led strenuously to compromise agreements. Agreement on the issues of trade unions and the right to strike, and wage and social demands, which were important to the goals of the strike, turned out to be the most difficult to achieve.³¹

What, then, from the standpoint of the goals of this strike, was the final settlement? Which demands, and in what form, were included in the signed "Final Decisions"?

In comparing the list of initial strike demands and their original tenor with the protocol of decisions we obtain an overall picture of the effectiveness of the negotiations. It looks like this:

In the protocol of the final decisions we find notations relative to 33 demands. In 15 cases the decisions do not deviate from the intentions contained in the initial demands. This pertains to six demands dealing with economics (protection of earnings of those workers who lost their health for work-related reasons, and a number of matters dealing with prices of consumer goods), four demands dealing with social matters including free (nonworking) Saturdays and better medical treatment, and two demands each dealing with political and protective-settlement matters. In 15 cases compromise solutions were reached which in various degrees take into account the intentions of the original strike demands. Among them are five social matters (e.g., pensions and annuities, family allowances, and upbringing allowances for mothers on maternity leave), two economic matters (including wage increases due to increase in cost of living), and five demands of a political nature, including demands concerning immediate protection for strikers (payment for duration of the strike). In those issues whose implementation would require money, the strikers agreed to a very far-reaching compromise, settling for declarations by the government

commission that were very general in their wording. In three cases, the wording of the negotiated compromise position does not reflect the intent of the strikers' demands. These are demands pertaining to the Catholic Church, special-privilege shops for government representatives, and announcement in the mass media of the strikers' demands. No joint position was established in the final protocol relative to the obligatory rule of only two terms of office for elected authorities. Therefore, this demand should be regarded as having been rejected. In addition, the government commission rejected two more demands (expenditures of the Hermaszewski space-flight type, and reduction in duration of military service), so, in total, it did not consider three demands. Already in the first phase of the negotiations the strikers withdrew two demands relating to internal matters of the Warski Shipyard.

The review of the results of the negotiations suggests that the optimism and feeling of success which was present at the signing of the "Final Decisions" protocol was fully justified, because the strikers achieved a great deal, and above all, a confirmation on the part of the government that the creation of a new, independent trade-union organization is not in conflict with the lawful order of the state.

* * *

Several thoughts in conclusion.

We have attempted to show that the Szczecin shipyard workers played a role in the Polish workers movement during the past 10 years which cannot be overrated. For it was they who in starting, as the first in their region, an open protest against existing social relations and living conditions were its organizers, formulated its goals and led in the battle for their implementation.

This role of theirs was perceived and approved by other workers. This is what one of the members of the factory strike committees wrote about them in a letter sent to the Interfactory Strike Committee in August 1980:

"The time to settle accounts has arrived (...) The accounting is done by the Polish shipyard worker, who through his stance, commitment and work expressed his respect, praise and trust. He is making an accounting of the economic figures, of the program of action which was outlined and accepted, and of the implementation of this program. Finally, he has a duty (and a right) to account for patriotic and civic attitude."

The description of the collective behavior, action and attitudes of this group as presented here permits us to conclude that their role goes far beyond that which could have been expected, considering their number and socio-demographic or occupational characteristics.

The Szczecin shipyard workers, just as those in Gdansk, without question formed themselves into a vanguard of the Polish working class; that is why observation of the changes that are occurring within this occupational group is not only of cognitive importance, but also of practical importance, especially in the area of politics.

FOOTNOTES

- x 1. E. Kolanka and T. Obrebski: "Cadres Qualified in the Socialized Economy of the Coastal Region." Szczecin, 1970; the authors state that both these functions have a decided influence on the development of Szczecin Province.
2. The city-building role of the Warski Shipyard has been discussed more extensively in an unpublished doctoral dissertation by T. Makowski: "The Shaping of the Workforce in an Industrial Enterprise." Szczecin, 1976.
3. In 1970 49.7 percent of the Warski Shipyard workers had more than an elementary-school education, compared with 37.5 percent in the country. The data for the country are cited from K. Zagorski: "Workers in the Socio-Occupational Structure." In: "The Birth of the Socialist Working Class." Warsaw, 1974, p 221.
4. For example, 37 percent of the Warski Shipyard workforce in 1970 was not over 26 years old. In 1978 this amount shrunk, but it is still considerable and amounts to approximately 25 percent. Women made up 12 percent of the workforce.
5. We use the word "revolt" for events at the turn of 1970-1971 after L. Adamczuk. See "The 1970-1971 Szczecin Revolt." Warsaw, 1981 (typescript).
6. As cited by L. Adamczuk, representatives of 40 of the largest plants supported the shipyard strikers by their presence, and the workforces of 93 plants submitted their demands to the "Final Decisions" protocol.
7. We cite this on the basis of a report obtained from the strike committee of the "Parnica" Repair Shipyard and the Warski Shipyard. See also the recollections: "On the Dignity of Man". JEDNOSC [Unity], 1981, No 33.
8. The word "strike" appeared for the first time on 20 August in GLOS SZCZECINSKI [Szczecin Voice]. See the bibliography of the local press prepared by P. Filipowiak.
9. T. Makowska personally met with such reactions by the inhabitants of the city in the area of the Warski Shipyard at the time the entry gates to the plant were closed and the workforce assumed authority.
10. Based on information collected from 16 Szczecin workplaces. See T. Makowska: "Who Struck and For What?". In: "The Szczecin Protest - August '80". Szczecin, 1981 (typescript).
11. See "Szczecin Protest..."
12. The function of permanent political and economic adviser was performed during the entire period of the strike in 1970 and 1971 by L. Adamczyk, employed as a sociologist. In 1971 the function of legal adviser was performed by F. Wilanowski (with no legal education). Both were employed at the time at the Warski Shipyard. In 1980 these functions were performed

in our area by local attorneys, whose assistance was indispensable during the negotiation of the demand pertaining to the establishing of independent trade unions. During the last 2 days of the strike, Prof Dr. A. Tymowski was adviser to the Interfactory Strike Committee on the demands dealing with wages and social matters.

13. See Adamczuk: "The Szczecin Revolt..."
14. We base this statement on an analysis of strike organizational structures covering 12 plants. See T. Makowska and P. Filipowiak: "The Szczecin Workers' Protest, August 1980". Szczecin, 1981 (typescript).
15. See Makowska and Filipowiak: "The Szczecin Protest..."
16. The December strike was broken by the authorities by, among other reasons, the real threat of a blockage of the shipyard, which cut off food supplies. See Adamczuk: "The Szczecin Revolt..."
17. We cite this fact on the basis of lists of striking plants maintained by the Interfactory Strike Committee.
18. See L. Dlouchy: "Our Origins." JEDNOSC [Unity], 1981, No 33.
19. See Makowska and Filipowiak: "The Szczecin Protest..."
20. We accept the concept of interests after J. Szczepanski: "Elementary Concepts of Sociology." Warsaw, 1970, p 343.
21. We believe that in a sociological examination of workers' protest behavior it may be useful to read J. Hochfeld on the subject of the articulation of group interests. See "Studies on the Marxist Theory of Society." Warsaw, 1963, p 186-190.
22. The initial list of Interfactory Strike Committee demands contained 36 numbered demands. Actually there were 38 of them, because one demand was not numbered, and demand No 32 pertained to two substantively different matters. After the negotiations began they received numbers--the demand that communication with Gdansk be restored was given No 39, and the demand for a ban on more than two terms of office for elected public officials was assigned No 33.
23. See Szczepanski on this subject: "Elementary Concepts...", p 247 and following.
24. Cited on the basis of documentation from the Interfactory Strike Committee. This number also included workers of workplaces which were not independent enterprises (local branches, departments, sections, workshops, local plants, job groups, etc.)

25. On the subject of the formation of a group based on a commonality or similarity of goals see Szczepanski: "Elementary Concepts....", p 346.
26. See on this subject Adamczuk: "The Szczecin Revolt..."
27. The subject of accumulating tensions in worker-authority relations is dealt with extensively by Adamczuk: "The Szczecin Revolt..."
28. Reference is being made to press reports on "obligations", by which the pipeline department in Warski Shipyard was to support the new government-party team and which became the direct cause of the January strike.
29. A more extensive report on the relationship of the local community to the strike is made by P. Filipowiak: "The Relationship of the Local Community." In: "The Szczecin Protest..."
30. On the growth of mental strain and physical fatigue in the strikers see Adamczuk: "The Szczecin Revolt..."
31. See Makowska: "Who Struck and What For?"...

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CSO: 2600/891

DISCUSSION ON MODELS OF SOCIALISM SUMMARIZED

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 2, Feb 84 pp 5-11

[Article by Stefan Opara: "The Controversies Concerning Socialism in Poland"]

[Text] Many viewpoints concerning today's Poland and its future have appeared as an aftermath of the crisis. One can encounter in the columns of periodicals various ideas that are not always ideologically inspired by official PZPR documents. This situation requires that a party ideological front be activated. The ideas of the Ninth Congress and the resolutions of the Central Committee require continuous promulgation and defense against distortions, cheap demagoguery and (most often) veiled criticism. The party line on struggle and understanding will not defend itself.

The controversies concerning socialism in Poland indicate wide ideological differences in concepts of prospects for our economy, politics and culture. Among the many words and apparent wealth of anticrisis recipes, one perceives clear attempts to create program alternatives to the party line and attempts to criticize the Marxist-Leninist ideological and political principles of socialism. Multi-hued evaluations of socialism also are appearing in nonparty periodicals. The spectres of old simplistic visions proclaiming that the socialism of Marx and Lenin is an "industrial utopia" and a "land of technology and work" that contravene traditional virtues and humanistic values continue to haunt the Catholic periodicals. It is difficult to believe that this type of criticism of socialism not only ignores human values, but also ignores those reflections of that concept that can be observed in the latest encyclicals of John Paul II.

Social visionaries also became active during the crisis. Some of them see the private sector and Polonia enterprises as the refuge and hope of Poland; others reject the idea of a worker-peasant alliance, nominating the peasantry alone as the politically leading social class, and the like. At the tip of the crisis-generated skepticism and proclaimed as dogma is the thesis that the system of social ownership has not proven true in Poland. One could ask: What would Warsaw look like if it were rebuilt by private owners of construction companies and apartment houses? One could ask: How and when would Polish capitalists implement the industrialization and urbanization of Poland, and build the many branches of the mining and manufacturing industries? Who would own the recovered factories and mines, and how would this be done? It is proclaimed that state

farms and agricultural cooperatives are ineffective, but more food per capita is produced by the socialized agricultures of Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Hungary than in Poland; in Poland this supposedly is not possible because of its "specification," traditions and the like.

Speaking of Polish tradition, it is worth mentioning that gmina ownership of land and the idea of a socialized agriculture that reach back to the socialism of Piotr Sciegienny occupy an important place in this tradition. The attempts of several years during the early 1950's to collectivize agriculture were compromises of the collectivization method and not a verification of the idea of socialization. Will small farms based on a horse and a piece of land always be numerically dominant in Poland? If not, then what road should we take in the future to modernize our agriculture? These and other questions should be asked of the creators of those agrarian development assumptions that are being submitted as alternatives to the party line. The position of the Ninth Congress and the Joint 11th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee and the ZSLNK [Chief Committee] concerning the stable principle of agricultural policy during the present period are known. The in-depth ideological interpretations that were outlined there call for future structural changes based on voluntary decisions that are in accordance with the progressive goals of the rural areas.

Program controversies concern other areas in addition to agriculture. While the party is focusing its attention on the need to implement the economic reform and more productive work as the only realistic premisses for overcoming the crisis, others propose economic miracles to the public. Thus, someone outside Poland is going to give us huge amounts of money free of charge; thus, prosperous villages are supposed to appear in Poland (already compromised in the neocolonial countries) that will be funded by citizens of other countries who are concerned about us; thus, huge amounts of oil will stream forth and free us of problems; thus, we are introducing miraculous custom duty resolutions and we will create a new Hong Kong, and so forth. These mirages of prosperity--brought into Poland from outside by capitalism--not only divert attention from the real economic problems but also simply state or imply theses that socialism is a barrier to fulfilling an economic miracle, and were it not for socialism, prosperity would occur in Poland as a result of bourgeoisie donations.

But let us put these concepts aside and turn our attention to some theories being voiced by members of our party. The activation of ideological discussions is valuable. But it is a disturbing fact that some participants in the discussions act as if the resolutions of the Ninth Congress and other official party documents do not exist. Most of the apparently new ideas are not surprising if one knows the history of ideological struggles during the process of realizing socialism. It should be remembered that V.I. Lenin, during the first years of building the Soviet state, struggled with, among others, Trotskyites and general dogmatists about the possibility of building socialism in Russia and its development free of hurra- for-the-revolution accelerations that were isolated from reality, and about the issue of nationalism and specifications of paths to socialism; and with revisionists about the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism, about the international ideological and political unity of the worker movement. Lenin also polemicized with the so-called "worker opposition" and "democratic centralists," with those who wanted to turn the

state over directly to a government of worker collectives (including trade unions) so that under the slogans of self-government and withering away of the state, centralism and the leading role of the party would be rejected. Lenin also polemicized with those who did not understand the domestic and international functions of a socialist state and who nourished delusions vis-a-vis the peaceful intentions of imperialism.

It is sufficient to consult our periodicals of the last period to see that old ideas return again and again clothed as new discoveries and theoretical revelations.

The Ninth Congress emphasized the need to perfect party work, to improve the style of work of its aktivs and apparatus, to expand the party's internal democracy. At the same time, the resolution states: "The leading and guiding role of the Marxist-Leninist party, the avantgarde of the working class, expresses most fully the interests of the entire nation and is an essential condition for developing socialism in Poland (...) The party's influence in society cannot be limited only to ideological influence over social consciousness. Restricting the party's function to the ideological-moral plane and denying it specific instruments to govern is a concept contrary to the fundamental principles of building socialism that bears negative consequences for overall political and social life."¹

These contents of the Ninth Congress resolution are neglected in some publications. Among the pronouncements in which, among other things, the social role of the PZPR is evaluated and in which it is difficult to perceive the inspiration of the resolutions of the Ninth Congress, the theories of Adam Schaff draw attention.

As we remember, not too long ago the idea appeared in a paper by this scholar that the building of socialism in Poland is ideologically invalid and is the result of errors by Marxists who disregarded Marx's advice. The reappearance of this old ideological problem that arose when Lenin debated Trotsky was greeted with reasoned criticism in our periodicals. An article by Marian Orzechowski published in the columns of NOWE DROGI (No 8, 1983) showed the baselessness of statements about the scientific illegality and prematurity of Poland's social revolution. The approaching 40th anniversary of the Polish People's Republic already has encouraged many authors to point out the origins and genesis of people's rule in Poland and to evaluate objectively the social premisses for the revolutionary changes in Poland. After the attempts to prove socialism illegal, original political propositions were then promulgated. Above all, the animosity toward the PZPR and its apparatus and scientific subsidiaries is not hidden. In evaluating the present crisis as a "historical error," the PZPR is deemed to be a remnant (i.e., an insoluble problem) which from all accounts is an "obstacle" for the authorities. But as long as the party survived, it is suggested that at least the apparatus of this party be deprived of political influence, in the belief that modern Poland's struggle with the so-called "dictatorship of the apparatus" is important. Also, the training apparatus of the party school system is treated consistently with disdain.

Without the PZPR or even a PZPR minus the influence of its executive apparatus, where would a government in Poland seek allies to build socialism? It is proposed that the church and peasantry be made agents of the government's current policies. One does not have to be an expert on Marx to evaluate the relation of these proposals to scientific socialism.

Jerzy Wiatr's works, among others, express concern that the party not aspire and lead too strongly to monopolize the authorities. In 1981, during the dramatic intensification of the political struggle in our country, one could detect in this author serious misgivings about centralizing the political system and foggy postulates such as "a differentiated base and superstructure system," "autonomy of socioeconomic processes," limiting interference in socioeconomic processes by "means of decisions of a political character," and the like. It should be acknowledged that a certain model vision is concealed by these slogans in which the party's leading role would at least be severely limited.

The Ninth Congress resolution emphasizes the need to struggle against technocratic-bureaucratic distortions and concurrently accents that a "strong state, and an efficient and modest state apparatus that is trusted and that provides service to the citizens, are conditions for developing socialist democracy."² State might and democracy are combined in the party's program. Meanwhile, attempts are appearing in many publications to counterpose democracy to centralism, self-government to the state apparatus, rule by the people to the state, collaboration in alliance with other parties and all constitutional political forces to the leading role of the party. The Leninist truth is forgotten, namely, that true social self-government in today's world requires a strong, socialist state, just as a strong state requires the genuine, democratic support of its citizens; it is also forgotten that the worker party assures the socialist character of the state. Despite the clear examples of history (including our history) that show what a state can be without strong, socialist democracy and what democracy can be without a strong state, there continues to be no shortage of explorers of old outworn ideas.

Even during those times when the party was ejected from workplaces and when the "dual government" concept led to a vision of assuming power, sympathy for the process appeared among party members. For example, the following has been observed in trade union political aspirations: The movement is realizing in practice the classic Marxist thesis concerning the possibility and need for the state to wither away, the state being considered an area of activity for professional politicians."³

The comprehensive theory for the basic transformation of the Polish socialist state in the direction of self-government has been noticed lately in the drawn-out essay "Pytanie o socjalizmu" [A Question Concerning Socialism].⁴ It outlines bold visions of political systems that are linked with some of Lenin's theses contained in his "Revolution and the State" and based on his quotes concerning the New Economic Plan. Thus, in striving toward socialism, Poland should take its own unique path, adapting certain concepts that have never been realized under our conditions, based on the basic creation of a republic of

worker self-government implementing state capitalism, a capitalism based on a system of civilized cooperatives, a system that initiates competition among cooperatives and domestic and foreign capitalism. I would like to apologize to the reader for this complex sentence, but this complicated system cannot be expressed more simply. To be specific, here are some quotes:

1. "Under modern Poland's conditions, there is no more important question than the problem formulated by Lenin concerning how we can learn to build state capitalism."
2. At the same time a link is made to the concept that proposes "a powerful historical vision, a vision of a semi-state" (my emphasis), or "the realization of a political system in which the workers themselves assume all the functions of administration, in which factory and territorial self-government completely replaces--and make superfluous--the alienated state apparatus."
3. Further on, a political system of "civilized cooperatives" will appear. Then we read: "A political system based on territorial self-government will not function properly as long as the members of the nascent communes are not integrated through joint participation in the production or exchange processes. Thus, the cooperative should be the nucleus of the political community ... "
4. Collectivization, however, will be incomplete because "in a system of civilized cooperatives a sharp competitive struggle must occur between the state and cooperative enterprises and the private firms representing foreign or domestic capital."

Imputing a Leninist derivation to the above-presented concept must rouse reservations. Instead, one can see here Fourier's ideas that are interlaced with Bakunin's or Abramowski's theories and ... economic liberalism. Thus, the sense of the originality of these visions is accurate to some extent. Among the over 100 nations of the world, only Poland is to be a semi-state, completely self-governing, where there also will be state capitalism and domestic and foreign capital, where workers rule, and whatever else anyone else can dream up. Matters concerning military and political threats, defense efforts, specialization associated with management in the realm of computers, the leading role of the party and other problems do not bother the visionaries of a semi-state.

Here it is worth emphasizing that the inconsistency between the development of self-government and self-governance, and strengthening the state and expanding class, socialist democracy, is one thing (this is an important point of the present PZPR political line) while the concept of a self-governing utopia, the treatment of self-government as an instrument for weakening and even replacing the state, and the disintegration of the political and economic system is another matter. Authors who have a sense of party solidarity with the Ninth Congress program should perceive this problem completely.

The advocates of "Polish socialism" have an especially strong feeling concerning the originality of their system. Because this slogan is often used demagogically, let us begin with certain theoretical ascertainments. The advocates of "Polish

socialism" do not link themselves to the PPR [Polish Worker's Party] concept of a "Polish road to socialism" (which at times they themselves emphasize). To Wladyslaw Gomulka, this slogan meant the realization of the universal goals of a people's democracy and then socialism that takes into account Polish conditions. This way of conceiving national paths to socialism is not questioned in the worker movement. In the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress one notes special emphasis on the fact that although the process of friendly relations among socialist states is expanding, it "does not obliterate the national specifications and the historical individualities of the socialist countries. In the variety of forms of their social life and economic organization, that which is reality should be seen: the opulence of paths and methods for strengthening the socialist way of life."⁵ Also, in our party's statute that was passed at the Ninth Congress we read, among other things: "Guided by the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the PZPR embodied its principles in accordance with the requirements of Poland's specific political, social, economic and cultural requirements."⁶ To the advocates of "Polish socialism," however, the above-outlined party platform acknowledging national individualities in socialism and the injunction that they be respected in realizing the universal principles and goals is not adequate. They devise a socialism in which there is no place for fundamental system principles (in particular, the leading role of the party arouses reservations).

The article "Socjalizm w Polsce, czyli polski socjalizm" [Socialism in Poland or Polish Socialism] is an example.⁷ Among the intricacies and many reservations one reads in this article that "Polish socialism" is based on the following principles:

1. a "strong and authentic self-governing cooperative movement";
2. an individual interpretation of the party's political role. The party should not lead, it should only guide in general. Comrade Sokolewicz is especially concerned that the state "fulfill not only the party's ideology but PRON's ideology as well." What is meant by "PRON's ideology" and whose interests it expresses is acknowledged by the author to be immaterial and leaves this question to the reader's conjecture;
3. the need "to take a number of actions to elucidate and discuss beforehand with allies controversial theoretical problems." It is difficult to guess here on what "specification" this postulate is based on;
4. Polish socialism should feature a "preponderance of individualism over collectivism." Does the author believe that the authentic self-governing cooperative movement that he demands is an expression of individualism?

Whatever these slogans mean (the author does not make it easy to decipher them), they conceal certain characteristic ideological undercurrents. The national specification is treated as an alternative to the universal principles of socialism. An elementary law of dialectics is forgotten here: that which is general does not exist autonomously but only in that which is concrete; universal socialism exists only through concrete socialism, including the socialism realized in Poland. Of course, defects in the theory of "Polish

socialism" are rooted not only in the disorders of dialectical thinking, mainly in the aspirations to compare that which is universal to that which is specific. That truth that our Polish road to socialism can be realized successfully only in the direction indicated by the general principles and internationalistic goals is either not understood or knowingly denied.

*

Poland is not a lone island isolated from the modern world. The social ideals of Marx and Lenin are being realized today in Poland under difficult conditions, internal as well as external. We are dragging ourselves out of the crisis through much effort and with the help of friends and under the constant pressure of enemies. In the evaluation of the Ninth Congress, the events in our social life brought about by the severe crisis occurred because of deviations from the principles of socialism and not because these principles were realized. An ideological evaluation of the current situation in Poland was presented at the 13th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, which was held last October.

The situation continues to subject our party and its social ideals to a severe trial. Party members and the party's ideological front are also subject to this trial. We are bound to oppose the attempt to consolidate the ideological and political shattering of the working class, to isolate this class from the theory of scientific socialism. The Marxist-Leninist party is the leading political force and thus the main target of attack; we must defend it. The unity of the party's ideology and organization is all the more indispensable for counteracting revisionist and dogmatic deviations from its policies and program principles.

The opposition continues to dream about the disintegration of the socialist community; they want to weaken Poland's fraternal, mutually beneficial ties with its socialist neighbors. The hysterical reactions of Western politicians and propagandists to the steps taken to strengthen these ties are the best proof of the considerations associated with the events in Poland.

The most dramatic stage of the struggle concerning the salvation of Poland's socialist accomplishments and prospects for socialist development has already passed. As emphasized in the documents of the 13th Plenum, the enemy has been isolated, but he has not laid down his arms. Illegal antisocialist groups continue to exist. In addition, the class enemy is seeking ways "to maintain his potential" in legal forms of activity; he is working to hamper the processes of understanding and to boycott socialist renewal.

The internal opponents are supported by foreign centers in the United States and in some NATO countries. The adventurist forces of imperialism are waging an economic war against Poland; they are using massive propaganda aggression and political blackmail. This is a good reason for domestic and foreign fronts for class struggle in the modern world to close ranks.

In the present situation, the help, support and trust of the fraternal communist and worker parties of the socialist community are playing an important part. Economic, political and ideological cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries is of great significance in overcoming these difficulties.

In realizing socialist renewal and in the struggle for a better tomorrow, we must appeal to internationalism based on the bonds of Marxist-Leninist principles and ideals. In looking at today's world, one can see how necessary it is to strengthen the socialist community. Whether the world will travel the road of armaments and confrontation imposed by imperialism or whether it will travel the road toward peace, coexistence and progress will depend to a great extent on the strength of our community, to which Poland will contribute an increasingly greater input.

FOOTNOTES

1. "IX Nadzwyczajny Zjazd Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej. Podstawowe dokumenty i materialy" [The Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Worker's Party. Basic Documents and Materials], Warsaw, Book and Knowledge Publishing House, pp 81 and 106.
2. "IX Nadzwyczajny ..." op. cit, p 112.
3. Kolakowski, A. and Lozinski, J., "Uspolecznic panstwo" [To Collectivize the State], Book and Knowledge Publishing House, 1981.
4. Mejbaum, J., "Pytanie o socjalizm" [A Question About Socialism], MIESIECZNIK LITERACKI, No 2, 1983.
5. "XXVI Zjazd Komunistycznej Partii Związku Radzieckiego. Podstawowe dokumenty" [26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Basic Documents], Warsaw, Book and Knowledge Publishing House, 1981, p 19.
6. "IX Nadzwyczajny ..." op. cit., p 169.
7. Sokolewicz, W., "Socjalizm w Polsce, czyli polski socjalizm" [Socialism in Poland, or Polish Socialism], TU I TERAZ, No 47, 23 December 1983.

11899

CSO: 2600/838

PZPR ORGAN VIEWS REFORM AS VEHICLE FOR 'INSTITUTIONAL' CHANGE

'Technical' Versus 'Institutional' Features

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 9 Apr 84 p 3

[Article by Krzysztof Krauss: "Economic Reform: Where Are We, What Next?"]

[Text] In the resolution adopted by the PZPR delegates to the national conference with respect to implementing the resolutions of the Ninth Congress, we read: "The party regards with the greatest attention the needs of workers and the rebuilding of material production that is the basis for meeting their needs. Downward trends in production have been overcome, and growth has started. The economic situation continues to be difficult, not all negative manifestations have been brought under control, and their elimination requires a long-term effort. We reaffirm the will for effective continuation of economic reform."

In a fundamental way, the reform fostered a relatively rapid and broad stirring of initiative in enterprises aiming toward a better exploitation of their reserves, stimulating production and improvement in financial results. The first manifestations of the exploitation of economic accounting and, based on these manifestations, the instruments that act to direct the processes of reconstruction and growth of the economy have been defined.

Deepening the processes of reform, and not departure from them, creates prospects for the effective resolution of the problems of greater efficiency and for a reconstruction of the production structure that will last, will be closer to actual expectations of society, and will gradually restore balance to the internal market and to relations with foreign partners.

Two Levels

Seeking an answer to the question as to where we are and what is next in the economic reform, we must first emphasize what the basic discriminant is in the changes that have been made thus far in comparison with numerous attempts made in the past to work out new methods of directing a socialist economy.

As a rule, in the past we were concerned with creating an up-to-date level of development of productive capacity and instruments through which the "center" could act on the course of real processes of management in conformity with

the purposes specified by that "center."

In a word, the intention was that these instruments were to give the greatest possible concentration of capacity and resources to tasks recognized in the plans of the "center" as being most important and urgent, that they would ensure the best possible relation between resources intended for carrying out these tasks, and by their effects, a proper coordination of action of various "units of management," minimum costs, maximum productivity, etc.

These are very important matters at this time also. A reform that would not satisfy these requirements would have no foundation, because it would not lead to progress in exploiting the capacity and resources of the country. But, in keeping with the line defined by the Ninth Congress of the party, proper instruments for carrying out the indicated economic tasks are not our only concern.

We are also concerned -- and this more than anything defines its deep political meaning -- about a fundamental increase in the self-determination of society with respect to the national economy as a whole, and of the work force with respect to their own enterprise, plant, section. Therefore, the subject matter of the reform is not only developing "good" instruments of passively directing technical-economic processes. It is also ensuring a real, decisive influence of society on defining the basic strategic goals that economic activity should serve in the country. In turn, in independent and self-financed enterprises, it is also ensuring the work force the position of true managers in their fields of activity.

In this way, the reform has not just a "technical" character, but primarily, an institutional character. It simultaneously promotes a better, more efficient management of materials and the so-called human factor in production and reinforces socialist democracy.

Frequently in evaluating the results achieved thus far of implementing economic reform, we concentrate exclusively on the "technical" side. Did the new instruments of indirect effect on amount of production, its quality, costs, etc., created by the reform, fulfill the hope that was placed in them, and to what extent? To what extent are they consistent with the target model, and to what extent are they still inconsistent? In which areas in the current, difficult conditions characterized by exceptional intensity of pressures in supply of raw materials, lack of funds for investment, lack of hard currency, is it necessary still to resort to certain elements of command?

Society Is the Manager

The need for a stable, critical analysis of experience associated with the "technical" side of the reform and how conclusions in this area are reached is never questioned in conference documents or in numerous statements made during discussions. Traditional periodic and annual reports on the state of implementation of the reform serve this purpose. Vice Premier Zbigniew

Messner spoke of these in a government report.

The conference placed special emphasis, and this in its basic document, the declaration, "What We Are Struggling For, Where We Are Going," on the need for effective political-institutional development of the content of the reform. This is expressed specifically in the postulate, formulated in this declaration, that the party, while carrying out a directing role, should be mindful that operations be consistent with the interests of the workers, ensuring citizens, especially the working class, of an increasing influence in resolving the problems of the country and their community.

We read in declarations: "At present the most urgent task is returning balance and capacity for harmonious development to the economy. What is needed is: improvement in efficiency and rationality of community effort, increase in productivity and quality of work, technological and organizational progress and thrifty management. To these goals we subordinate strengthening and improving the planning and management system and modernization of the economic structure of the country. The requirements this involves must be matched by the economic consciousness of society and the attitude of management personnel and the work force."

Consciousness Based on Participation

Full and authentic consciousness of society can grow only on the basis of direct, active participation in the multistage process of developing an economic strategy at the level of the country and of all organizations that must implement that strategy.

The "Directions of Economic Reform," confirmed by the Ninth Congress, state: "Socializing planning depends on true participation of society in creating plans that define the goals of economic activity and in participating in implementing these plans. A condition for the realization of a plan is active support by most of society, which at the same time supervises its implementation."

The conference not only confirmed this principle, but also delineated a very specific program for further reinforcing the practice of coparticipation of society in managing economic affairs. It is expressed specifically in the announcement of the presentation to society and the Sejm, as early as this year, of the principles of the national social-economic plan for the years 1986-1990 and a prospective plan to 1995, or making real modifications in the course of developing central annual plans.

In keeping with the principles formulated by the resolution on planning, annual plans are developed and confirmed by the government, obviously on the basis of guidelines emanating from Sejm resolutions concerning long-term plans. The assurance of significantly deeper consideration not only by representative bodies, but by society in general of the content of central annual plans and what the basic guidelines should be for enterprises in developing their own technical-economic plans is anticipated.

A greater and more effective insight of society, for example, into defining tasks of the central plan for 1985, should ensure the publication in the mass media as early as in the first half of this year of the principles of next year's central annual plan. This would make it possible, on the one hand, to carry out timely, extensive consultations on this subject, and on the other hand, it would make it easier for administrations and self-governments of enterprises to consider with the necessary foresight the tasks emanating from the central plan. We are not dealing here with any kind of return to the command style of directing the economy. Independence and self-government of enterprises is an immutable principle of the reform. But we are concerned that a unified economic policy prevail in the country, the same one "at the top" and "at the bottom."

As is known, this is not always the case at present. The reason why the policies of enterprises sometimes swerve from the priorities of the central plan do not rest exclusively in disturbances in the mechanisms of economic connections. Very frequently the reason is simply lack of clarity and imprecision of goals that the central plan formulates for the specific economic centers. This creates a broad field for the propagation of agency and branch particularisms and for the domination of a shortsighted view of their own place and role in the country's economic policy as a whole, which is the result of a lack of a sense of stability.

It was stated at the conference that reform is an accomplished social-economic fact. It incites opposition, which is understandable, among our political opponents since success of reform introduced by the party is a setback for antisocialist tendencies. It also incites the opposition of those for whom the new economic regulations are a threat to their erstwhile privileged positions.

Obviously, the reform has its weaknesses, and those weaknesses must be eliminated. But it is high time to end the bandying of arguments for and against the reform because the principles and the correctness of the reform have been confirmed by life. The time has come for this reform to be learned and effectively applied. Everywhere, at every level of management, over the whole spectrum of the economy with no exceptions or deviations.

Promoting Workers Self-Management

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 11 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Marzenna Wieczorek: "Social Focus of Reform"]

[Text] Evaluating the results of implementing the economic reform, we concentrate most often on the technical aspects and therefore on size of production, quality and decrease in costs of production. But we forget that the reform also has an institutional character, that its purpose is not only to develop proper economic indices, but primarily to spread socialist democracy, to socialize the process of management.

The reform would be incomplete without participation of the work force in managing an enterprise and in controlling, through their representatives, the processes of production and actively participating in developing long-term strategy for the development of the enterprise. Only mature economic consciousness on the part of society can ensure understanding and acceptance of the tasks placed before the economy.

Workers' self-government has become the basic sanctioned law on self-management of the work force in a state enterprise, the form of participation of workers in management. The law of 3 years ago gave far-reaching authority and competence to workers' councils and general meetings of delegates. Let us remember, however, that self-management became active during a difficult period for the country, a period not free of disturbances and political tensions or of economic difficulties. But at the same time, those difficult years were for many self-management bodies and their activists a real school for character and civic attitude. Those who passed through this school can feel themselves to be true co-managers of enterprises. There are, however, self-management bodies that are young, that are only entering into their role, and indeed, the process of creating them was neither easy nor rapid.

Participation of workers' self-management bodies in management became a fact. Self-management functions in 90 percent of the more than 6,500 enterprises in which it is authorized. Almost 100,000 individuals participate in workers' councils, and of these 60 percent are workers.

But we are not concerned with numbers. The main thing is how self-management sees its place and role in the plant, does it take advantage of the authority that has been granted it by law. There are many examples indicating real work on the part of self-management bodies, the feeling of responsibility for the fate of the work force and the enterprise. But there are also examples of self-management bodies that close their eyes to low quality of production, poor use of work time, cost increases, waste of raw materials and supplies. It happens that plant particularism, the race for profit, or a baseless increase in wages not tied to production begins to take ascendancy over public interest.

What is concerned here is finding a judicious compromise between the needs of the economy and potentials of the enterprise, between the higher public interest and expectations of the work force.

This compromise is not an easy one, as the participants of the recently concluded Third All-Polish Council of Representatives of Self-Management of the Work Force confirmed. Many plants find themselves in a difficult economic situation which places additional tasks before members of workers' councils: how to increase or even maintain the present level of production when raw materials and supplies are lacking, when workers are leaving. How to improve quality and implement thrift programs in the face of complicated conditions? How to meet the wage demands of the work force? This is the circle of economic woes in which representatives of self-management were trying to find the causes of their own internal difficulties.

A real problem was also raised during the conference: the lack of professional preparation of activists in workers' councils, which is made additionally difficult by changes in the mechanisms of reform. Voices were also heard, however, saying that the workers directly linked to the work place could best detect all improprieties in the functioning of the enterprise. If we intend to restore the economy, we must start with ourselves; it has been proven that it is specifically at the work place that economies and adequate quality of production will be effected; it is there also that the decision will be made as to the length and efficiency of a day's work.

Self-management is a young institution, but this does not free it of openly presenting the problems of the plant and undertaking efforts to eliminate negative developments. Its social usefulness must be confirmed in every-day, managerial thinking. There is a series of matters to be resolved, and the law on self-management of the work force creates a broad framework for action of representative organs of the work force. Indispensable, however, is understanding on the part of many enterprises and workers' councils of the simple fact that producers are at the same time consumers.

Editorial Reaction

Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish No 16, 15 Apr 84

[Article by SC: "Self-Determination and Hard Money"]

[Text] The number of columns on the subject of the reform has decreased somewhat lately. After arguments and discussions on the subject of the modifications introduced on 1 January and on the subject of the law that creates the possibility of setting up plant systems of pay, there followed a period of expectation. What effects will these changes have? How will the enterprises adapt to them? Will the policy of hard money really take root and force an improvement in efficiency?

In this period of journalistic drought two columns that appeared during the past week caught our attention: the interview with Professor Sadowski in ZAGADNIENIA I MATERIAŁY, and the article of K. Krauss in TRYBUNA LUDU.

Let us begin with the second item. It is true that it does not answer the question contained in the title, "Where Are We, What Next?" but it does take up a very real political-institutional problem of the content of the reform, and not just its economic significance. The reform must ensure a very real influence of society on delineating the goals of economic activity, and on the enterprise, it must accord the work force the role of authentic managers of their work places. The author also emphasizes that economic consciousness of society can grow only on a foundation of active participation in developing the management strategy at all levels.

These legitimate themes were reduced to a single specific matter, to socializing the process of central planning. This is obviously a matter that is very important, but in no way does it account for every aspect of the problem

of society's self-determination in the realm of economic activity. At the enterprise level, that is, in the realm of the real world, this self-determination is exercised primarily through the duties discharged by workers' self-management bodies, although it cannot be relegated only to this form of cooperation in management. The significance and role of self-management bodies was emphasized once again by the national council with the participation of General Wojciech Jaruzelski and other representatives of the highest party and state authorities. I believe that the answer to the question of where we are with the reform and what must be done next cannot be formulated without an evaluation of the development of workers' self-management bodies, and the places that they occupy in the social and economic life of the country.

Such an evaluation is not easy to make, but then the reality is exceptionally complicated. Self-management bodies have various negative feelings toward regulations and toward specific authorities, and the latter frequently think that these bodies are too careful about a particular interest of the enterprise and place too little weight on improving the organization of work, increasing productivity, decreasing material-consuming practices, etc. Cooperation is obviously necessary, but we must not forget that one of the most significant functions of self-management is supervision of the task of economic administration; and the hard struggle for one's own entitlements when they are disregarded or denied in specific instances. By the same token, ideal agreement or harmony cannot be expected, this would actually be a disquieting phenomenon since it would indicate that one of the partners is dominating the others, and this is not what the reform intends.

The interview with Professor Sadowski, deputy of the plenipotentiary of the government for the reform, mentioned in the beginning, is devoted mainly to problems of the economic-financial instruments, although obviously it does not entirely pass over social-political matters. The matter of FAZ [vocational activization fund] was given much attention, particularly the modification in the method of computing the debit-free base introduced on 1 January 1984. Professor Sadowski convincingly justified the need for such a modification, although he admitted that it might cause certain problems for some enterprises.

Much has also been written on the subject of this change in ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE. And it seems that it always arouses much emotion. Perhaps there is a certain misunderstanding here which it would be worth our while to explain at this time. The principle itself that for the coming year, the base wage fund free of FAZ levies should include only that part which was not taxed in the preceding year is in complete agreement with the principle of the policy of hard money, and it cannot be attacked as a whole. Specifically, this pertains to the fact that this year certain cushions were granted to enterprises that did not reduce production during the past years and now have no possibility of increasing production as others might, and by the same token also of increasing wages. But does this mean that all complaints and claims connected with this matter, made by either the administration of the enterprises or by self-management bodies, can be considered to be without

merit? It seems to me that the authorities, and specifically, the office of the plenipotentiary for the reform, should admit being at fault in at least one matter. This concerns the point in time when this change was announced. Some enterprises would certainly not have raised wages in 1973 had they known at the beginning of the year that FAZ levies would be transferred in full to the following years. They found out about this only at the end of the year when payments became a fact, and when there was no time for a possible change in wage policy. Most of the claims which have come to my attention pertained not so much to the principle itself as to the time when it was announced.

This is worth remembering because although the principles of reform may be stable for the next two years, at the end of 1985 it will probably be necessary again to introduce some modifications. There is enough time, so perhaps these modifications can be prepared and the public informed sufficiently in advance.

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CSO: 2600/917

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON NEWLY APPOINTED GENERAL

Brief Biographical Data

Warsaw PRZEGLAD WOJSK LOTNICZYCH I WOJSK OBRONY POWIETRZNEJ KRAJU in Polish No 1, Jan 84 p 6

[Article: "Tadeusz Jemiolo Promoted to General"]

[Text] On the 40th anniversary of the creation of Polish People's Army the Council of the State promoted 13 colonels to brigadier generals. Tadeusz Jemiolo, chief of the Higher School for Radio Technology Officers, was among them in his airman's uniform.

He began his military career in 1959 as a student in the school he now commands. After becoming a commissioned officer he worked as an equipment technician in a unit of the National Air Defense Forces [WOPK] while at the same time continuing his education as an extension student in the Silesian Higher Engineering School. In 1976 he graduated from the Academy of the Polish Army General Staff.

His organizational and leadership abilities, as well as personal virtues, led to fast advancement in the hierarchy; among other things, he commanded a tactical formation.

Brig Gen Eng T. Jemiolo is an active member of the party. At the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress he was elected to the Central Committee. His current interests focus on problems involving the education and training of highly qualified experts in radioelectronics. He claims that "modern military technology can be operated well only by superbly trained specialists with thorough knowledge and comprehensive skills who also have deep ideological commitment."

In the December 1977 issue of PRZEGLAD WOJSK LOTNICZYCH then Lt Col T. Jemiolo wrote on this subject: "The sociopolitical teachings play a fundamental role in shaping ideological and moral attitudes. They enable students to deepen their knowledge of the theory and methodology of Marxism-Leninism, which are indispensable for understanding contemporary mechanisms of social development, and for correct diagnosis of social and political phenomena in the country and the world. This knowledge is needed by officers (...) who, as political activists, should be able to educate their subordinates according to the principles of socialist morality and ethics, in the spirit of commitment to the cause of building a socialist society."

A decisive majority of the graduates of the Higher School for Radio Technology Officers directed by General Tadeusz Jemioło possess these attitudes.

Additional Details on Career

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ POLSKI in Polish No 11, 11 Mar 84 pp 9, 15

[Article by Zbigniew Damski: "What It Means To Be a Soldier"]

"I graduated from this school in 1962," says Brig Gen Tadeusz Jemioło, "and I returned on 13 October 1981."

The young lieutenant "radiotechnical" graduate needed 19 years to be able to add "Col Dipl Eng" before his name, and to become commander of his alma mater. Should we say only 19, or as many as 19?

Only 19, I think. Nineteen years is a lot of time, but if one takes into consideration the height of his climb...

"Especially since I was always going uphill."

A teasing smile points to the proper way of judging this casual remark: well, we will go up even those slopes. However, let us get back to 1962 in school:

"It offered a 3-year program and the instruction was on the level of a technician."

But it also provided knowledge and skills very much needed and sought by the military, concerning surface-to-air rockets. The weapons were new then, covered by absolute secrecy. Native specialists in these weapons were being groomed, but...

In 1963 rocket-firing exercises were being held for the Warsaw Pact at one of the training grounds deep in the USSR. A competition for the best technician was announced. It was won by a certain Polish lieutenant, Tadeusz Jemioło.

"And I also realized how much I lacked solid theoretical knowledge."

For the next 5 years he studied in the Electric Engineering Department of the Silesian Higher Engineering School, in evening courses because of his active service status. He passed successive exams and semesters and, at the same time, successive rungs in the military hierarchy: platoon commander, then company commander. He became the deputy commander of a unit in charge of technical matters after receiving his electrical engineering diploma.

He commanded this unit for 5 years, until another order sent him to various places in the country and to higher posts: commander of a military unit specifically devoted to so-called radio-electronic combat. The more complicated the type of action, the better specialist and organizer is needed to lead it. It should be remembered that the unit had twice been singled out for praise in orders of the Ministry of National Defense, although its commander had already begun studies at the General Staff Academy.

"No, they were not regular studies--I commuted. I already had some experience in this kind of education..."

So, both the engineering schools and the academy are probably those uphill places he mentioned. Well, it looks like the traveler picked them himself. He decided for himself: now I shall climb this mountain, and then that one. He simply wanted this.

The course on automatization of command systems he took in the USSR was probably not "uphill." It was indispensable. The modern commander of a tactical unit (especially in the National Air Defense Forces) needs to use the aid of analog computers linked into whole systems.

"They used to call us '5-minute forces.' Nowadays this time has shrunk even more..."

An excellent specialist in a given field can be recognized by his ability to explain his art to a layman in such a way that the latter understands it. I understood, but there is not enough space to convey it. It is an exceptionally complicated field of modern military knowledge, and an exceptionally important one as well, for the question of whether our country can avoid surprise from the air and is able to defend itself against attack depends on them, people in steel uniforms who stand without interruption by their electronic equipment. There are no unimportant posts there. Even the smallest one is a link in a cohesive chain through which information is transmitted to a place where it is digested and options are given to the commander for ultimate decision. It is he who will press the proverbial button releasing antiaircraft rockets into the air.

"Of course, we deployed and started up that system..."

Until now this has been a "strictly military" biography: the service, unceasingly striving to perfect oneself for its sake. Is this not enough? The man in the uniform is also, at the same time, a citizen of his country. Therefore, it is inconceivable that he would separate his service activities from social, political and party activities...

"...because these are absolutely inseparable matters."

For that reason, in July 1981, Col Tadeusz Jemiolo left his place of residence on the coast to go to Warsaw: he was elected delegate to the Ninth Party Congress.

At the congress Col Tadeusz Jemiolo was elected to the Central Committee.

"I worked at the congress in the Youth Commission," he remembers, "and I am still a member of it."

Who among the officers of the Polish People's Army is unfamiliar with youth issues, especially if he comes from a line position where he is also an educator and, in addition, if he is only 41 years old?

Barely 3 months after the Ninth Congress Col Jemiolo is among the youth for good--in the Jelenia Gora school. It is a perfect occasion to bring before the Central Committee issues and problems concerning young Poles, observed live, within the group, even though these young men in uniform differ from their civilian counterparts...

However, one cannot be exclusively involved in educational and school matters; 13 December 1981 arrived.

"I carried out the duties of military commissar for Jelenia Gora Province together with the duties of school commander," says Brig Gen Tadeusz Jemiolo. "This was possible only thanks to the fact that the school has an excellent cadre. Besides, one of our binding principles says: 'the army one step before the party.' For that reason almost all officers were working for the most important things--the rebuilding of party cells, trust in the authorities and the party, uniting people..."

The terrain was a difficult one. Perhaps not as much as elsewhere, because this is a region of settlers. They are a different kind of people, but Jemiolo had the advantage because he came from here. This is his country. He is almost a native. His parents moved here from Rzeszow Province, he graduated from high school here, in Zlotoryja, and he was a rural teacher in Nowy Kosciol ("I was getting another, teacher's high school diploma... as an extension student") before he went to the Jelenia Gora Officers School.

"I surely had it easier..."

Dozens, hundreds of meetings and conversations. Working meetings and advisory ones. On the provincial and gmina level. With the clergy. With the so-called average citizen and with the authorities.

"The point was to build joint responsibility for the future of the common good, whether at a workplace, village, or town. What was needed was the humanization of the exercise of power."

This process could be directed only by a strong and active party; in Jelenia Gora Province the basic elements had "started up" already by the end of January 1982.

"Even today our region is having an easier coming out of the crisis," says Brig Gen Tadeusz Jemiolo, who has been a member of the executive board of the Provincial Committee since the last reports-elections campaign." This probably follows from the specifics of the region. Take industry, for example. Enterprises are rather small (luckily we do not have "giants" here...) but their production is for the most part based on our own raw materials and energy resources. That's the reason why our province is in fifth place, together with Walbrzych Province in the nation..."

For one man this is an enormous load of duties. They have not been diminished by the general's rank conferred in 1983 at a solemn ceremony in the Belvedere Palace--on the contrary. Moreover, the mandate as a delegate to the Ninth Congress has not expired. They will meet again at the National Conference of Delegates.

"What will it be like?" asks the general. "It will certainly be a review and evaluation of how the resolutions of the Ninth Congress were carried out, but one also has to think through the forms of party work, so that its effectiveness grows even further. There is a lot to do in the area of political culture, especially since political struggle will require using more offensive forms. A special subject for our consideration will be youth issues..."

They are not easy. While the present subordinates of the general (officer cadets) do not have to worry about their material conditions, and they have assured jobs in the future as well as "service residence," their contemporaries outside the military school are in a much more difficult situation.

"Those who already try to shout that everything is fine are rendering a disservice," says the general. "These are very serious matters, and they hold the first place in the Central Committee. We undertake various initiatives, but one must not have illusions: no changes for the better take place from day to day, and they cannot be decreed from above."

The true picture of "below" is easy to spot in the streets of Jelenia Gora. It is full of contrasts. Old houses which have not fallen apart are being repaired; in Zabobrze a new, modern city was created. A long line waits in front of the meat and candy stores ("Oranges have arrived!"), but they are also in front of the Julia glass factory store, where terribly expensive crystals are being sold. Near the bus station a poster of the Adventist Church attempts to allure the passersby...

This is not only a struggle for existence, but also a struggle for souls. Which one is more important?

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CSO: 2600/850

PROBLEMS OF MIGRATION INTO SLOVENIA REVIEWED

Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian No 395, 10 Mar 84 pp 28-31

[Article by Vesna Kesic: "How Slovenia Imports Workers"]

[Text] The official term is this: "workers from other Yugoslav republics and provinces working in SR [Socialist Republic] Slovenia." The phrase, which seems precise, but overlong, awkward and cumbersome for everyday use, is a good indicator that we are dealing with a very sensitive ideological-political issue in our system. Everyday language, as is usually the case, has found its own ways of putting it, so that Slovenians refer to the workers from other republics and provinces as "southerners," "Bosnians," "Swedes," "banjanerosi," "bosancerosi"... The jargon of common sense, by contrast with the political jargon, is always a bit ironic, simplified to the maximum and imprecise, and is indicative of the inclination to stereotypes in thinking, to emotionally loaded and oversimplified concepts of a phenomenon. After all, not all of these people are from the south, nor from Bosnia, nor is ethnicity their essential feature, but neither are they only "workers working in SR Slovenia" either. It has been noted that they themselves rarely use ethnic attributes--"Slovenians," "non-Slovenians"; more frequently they use a social indicator of stratification: "we down here" and "those up there."

In the recent period a stream of between 8,000 and 9,000 people a year have flowed into Bosnia from other communities to work. By comparison with the 16,000 workers who immigrated in 1969, that number shows a declining tendency, but economists predict that in the period up to 1985 Slovenia will have an annual requirement of about 12,000 workers, and they will not be recruited from their own community. The statistics show that about 160,000 workers from other republics and provinces are living in Slovenia. But it is assumed that this number would be about 30 percent more when those who are not registered are included. Every day another 160,000 people commute to jobs in Slovenia, which means that immigrants have a share of about 20 percent in the total population of Slovenia (1.8 million), which is neither small nor to be neglected. Their composition with respect to education is low, especially those who came in the first wave of migration some 15 or so years ago. They make up about 70 percent of the Slovenian labor force with little training, unskilled or semiskilled. But recent figures show that Slovenia has also become attractive to highly educated manpower--not because of

jobs alone. Slovenia is today one of the strongest regions of immigration in Europe, is dependent upon "imported" manpower, and is burdened with the problems which accompany the "normal" method of modernizing traditional society. That is, it is not easy after decades of development when terms like "the labor market" were proscribed, to confront the large internal migration whose basis is the "rigid" economic law of supply and demand.

It is also disquieting to see Ljubljana on Saturday and Sunday, when 90 percent of the "old settlers" (Slovenes) leave the city and go to the scene of their myths, to the "Slovenian hills," or "for the weekend," that is to weekend cottages. Then one hears in the street only the speech and dialects from the "south," and the "Bosnians" take over the smoke-filled Austro-Hungarian coffeehouses and the cheaper restaurants. A comparison with our own Gastarbeiter, who spend their free time in the "Banhofs" of the German cities, is impossible to avoid, although it does not occur to anyone to deny an essential difference: the workers from the other republics have all political and civil rights set down in legislation. The differences between them and the Slovenes, the potential and actual conflicts, the tensions, but also the possibilities for a new spirit of community, arise in the social domain over questions of status, origin, culture and customs.

So, although the conflicts usually break out in the symbolic domain (the issue of "purity of the language," of the "threatened national identity," of the customs--of both groups, and so on), still the tensions have arisen from the distribution of power and the lack of it in the production process and in control over goods and ideas. In actuality they operate like a spirit of competition in hiring, the distribution of income and control of the work process, in promotion through the political, professional and similar ranks, and in education.

Economically motivated migration is a quite recent phenomenon in our society, and Slovenia was not altogether unprepared for them, but, as sociologist Silva Meznaric says, it still did not have an adequate immigration policy. Empirical research (oriented from the first toward external migrations and summarized at the level of Yugoslavia, but later "broken down" by republics) has been conducted for some 15 years now.

The press, politicians and everyday life often concern themselves with migrations and with the relationship between the immigrants and the new community, since that is an area of latent social tension, but their concern mainly comes down to an intermittent concern with excesses, that is, even the "excessive" itself is highly ideologized, which is inevitable.

"I feel that it is the task of sociology," Silva Meznaric says, "precisely in the area of these tensions with which common sense is so much concerned to develop and demonstrate an apparatus suitable to itself and to prove that this situation, which is potent in its conflicts, but, which we usually forget, also with consensuses, cannot be explained with the language of ordinary common sense, with ideological and political language, and it must not be dealt with that way, since that is irresponsible.

Typology of Behavior

The sociology of migrations, if a true picture of the situation is to be obtained, must concern itself simultaneously with the immigrants and with the society into which they have come (the immigrant society). Some Slovenian research has also covered the areas where emigration originated (the emigrant society). The researcher is actually interested in the interspace, that is, the space in which interaction occurs between the immigrants and the society in which they have been received, at the level of the institution and among individuals. The social changes which occur in mutual communication and in community life--convergence, conflicts, transformations of the previous way of life, of value systems, culture and customs--can be detected most easily under our conditions in two dimensions. The first is the breadth of participation in society and its institutions, from the family, the local community, the workplace, to sociopolitical organizations, and the second is identification (of both groups) with the norms, values and symbolic space of the immigrant society and the immigrants.

The transformations that occur in this interaction may be positively or negatively directed, may be "desirable" or "undesirable." Certainly, the plus sign or minus sign is determined from the viewpoint of the society and its elementary values, but it is the task of sociology to prevent its scientific task from being governed by ideology and day-to-day political needs (that is, the interests of the ruling stratum of a majority society). Figures obtained in the survey conducted by Silva Meznaric and her collaborators have confirmed that it is not possible to speak of immigrants (non-Slovenes) "as such," nor about a single type of reaction by the Slovenes to the immigrants. The features and behavior of both can be arrayed along a definite continuum from extremely negative to the positive and desirable.

At the "bottom" of that continuum is an apathetic and marginal group which is isolated both from its own ethnic group and also those others. Contacts and participation in the social system are narrowed to work and possibly to the family, although usually these are single persons, young people with a low level of education who perform repetitive manual jobs in which they have no interest. The Slovenes in that group are most "troubled" by being on the outer edge with respect to social influence and power, and the non-Slovenes by being on the outer edge with respect to status in society. The immigrants in that group show hostility or apathy toward the values, norms and symbols of Slovene society, but their aggressiveness is indiscriminately directed, usually toward the immigrant community itself. They do not believe in the possibility of changing their status in the new community.

The next type of behavior is isolation from the immigrant (Slovenian) society when it comes to non-Slovenes, or these are Slovenes who do not come into contact with the immigrants, but both show a definite stability within their own group and a pronounced orientation toward acquisition. This group does nothing but work, sit at home, save its money, build a house in Slovenia or back at home. In terms of status this group may be highly placed (well-off, for example), but their interests do not leave that horizon either in the symbolic domain or in connection with the participation in work and self-management. For example, they never "get riled up" because of something which

happens in the work organization. Their family is the principal point of support to provide stability, solidarity and expression.

The third group consists of immigrants who are isolated from their immigrant origins and are fast being integrated into Slovene society, but mainly in an instrumental way, that is, through the dimension of the workplace and acquisition, to which everything else is subordinated. They are learning the language, they are participating in self-management, they are active in political organizations, they are enrolled in the trade union, they read the weekly family newspaper JANU and KOMUNIST, they have not brought their ethnic values with them (they say that they have never been a member of a club of people from their native place), nor are they adopting new norms and symbols either. The Slovenes in this group do not communicate with the immigrants, but they are very much present and active in their own community. They feel, for example, that reputation is gained by holding office, not through work, and they have a pronounced feeling of national identity. In answer to the question of how they spend their free time, they usually reply that they are "building a house," fixing up their apartment on the "do-it-yourself" principle, or repairing their house. They believe that the immigrants are threatening the Slovenian language, customs and culture. These are typical representatives of what we tend to refer to as the middle class, S. Meznaric says.

The next group on the continuum, a cohesive, traditional ethnic group, consists of those Slovenes and non-Slovenes who greatly insist on their ethnic signs and customs, culture and their own language. The immigrants in this group, by contrast with the previous ones, are ethnically conscious (they are concerned with folklore, for example), at home they speak only their own language, and their typical expression about language is this: "We respect theirs (Slovenian), but we love our own." They participate in the life of immigrant groups in an organized way, they show a high level of solidarity with all non-Slovenes, but they also show an orientation toward the universal values of Slovenian society. They are aware of the difficulties brought by the large population of non-Slovenes, that is, which they themselves have caused in their new community, but they think that they are useful to the development of Slovenia and that the nationalities come closer together in this way. The Slovenes in that group communicated on a differentiated basis with the immigrants when necessary (to the level of "friendship," but they would not marry them), they do not react in a chauvinist or segregationist way, they are very much interested in the development of Slovenian culture and language, and they get upset because of linguistic pollution. They usually live in a stable large family which has stayed put. Both segments, at different levels, participate in social life, from the local community and the workplace to sociopolitical organizations, and many of both segments are members of the party. Within that group, more frequently than in the previous ones, there is a linkage of the immigrants with local elites.

At the "positive" end of the continuum is the so-called open, active and critically oriented group. On both sides these are mainly educated young people with high social status, among the immigrants a kind of "elite" which comes from the more highly developed regions and belonging to nonproduction occupations. They are predisposed toward various forms of self-organization,

but not on a folklore basis, but on a social and political basis. In both segments of this group one senses a high degree of tolerance and interest in the other culture and its values. The Slovenes are aware of the problems of the immigrants, they are informed about the entire region of Yugoslavia (they are listeners and watchers of non-Slovene TV and radio stations). They believe that workers come to Slovenia from other communities because it lacks manpower and because the Slovenes no longer want to do the rough physical jobs, they believe that nationalities are coming closer together through this and that the immigrants should be afforded the possibility of bringing their families.

As we see from this typology, the patterns of experience and behavior may vary greatly, but mutual relations of Slovenes and non-Slovenes condemned to living together may develop in differing directions. It is not an encouraging datum--if we compare the figures from a survey conducted in 1975 and another of the same kind in 1980--that there has been a large growth of resentment of the foreign workers on the part of the Slovenes. Earlier the feeling of "threat to the language and national culture" was not significant, nor was the category of "the job threat," which emerged only with the closing of the European manpower market, which up until that time had attracted Slovenes with a "surplus of aspirations" (highly educated people looking for better jobs and a higher standard of living), whose jobs are still being "invaded" by workers from other parts of Yugoslavia. Yet it is encouraging that the quite recent waves of immigrants are communicating much more richly and diversely with Slovenian society than those which came at the very beginning. Changes are also noticeable in the structure of the traditional family of the immigrants: the birth rate is dropping, the man is taking over a part of the housework, the female children are also attending school, and so on. There is also a change in their mode of communication and institutions: "they are discovering" that corruption and connections are not the customary form of communication.

In working on the study of immigration in Yugoslavia, Silva Meznaric has since 1973 moved up from documentarist to an independent researcher. She recently traveled to the United States with a scholarship from the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, where, as she says, she will make up for the information drought that has occurred in Yugoslavia in recent years and will inform herself about new methods and knowledge concerning ethnic and national conflicts in the Third World. We asked her what makes Slovenia special as the most markedly immigration society in Yugoslavia, but still not the only one?

Immigration Policy

"Slovenia is the only republic in which immigration from the other Yugoslav republics is a national problem or, better put, where it is a problem of the identity of a nationality. It could not be said, for example, that the Bosnians who come to Croatia are a problem for that nationality. Conflicts--if there are any--show up differently there. Slovenia has in the past been the most homogeneous republic from the ethnic standpoint, and for the first time in its history it encounters a major immigration of a non-Slovene population.

Because of its speed and unexpectedness and because society was unprepared for those new relations, the problem of interethnic relations arose for the first time in Slovenia. As far as I know the official political world, that world which is called upon to conduct an immigration policy, did not for a long time react with anything that might be called a well-thought-out immigration policy, nor indeed has it even now. But the institutions of the immigrant society are called upon everywhere in the world to regulate the status of the immigrants, the relations between the immigrant society and the people who are arriving, and to prepare the immigrant society for those relations in terms of ideology, values and organization."

"Did Slovenian institutions and society get caught by the wave of immigration, or were they able to react in good time?"

"It is difficult to fix the time, but, at least as far as science is concerned, sociology in this particular case, this was not so difficult, since we have long been concerned with migrations, since the beginning of the seventies, almost from the time when they started. Yet there were reactions of the 'closed room' type, they were not felt in public, there were cases when the inevitable conflicts, when they reached a climax, became the subject of a campaign in the press and in speeches, and they were reduced to incidents between individuals. Everyone here knows that very tense relations sometimes prevail between the Slovenes and the non-Slovenes, that stereotypes are rampant in both populations, that the mutual unfamiliarity goes very deep, especially in the case of the Slovenes, who have no idea at all who these people are who have come, nor the kind of cultures they are now coming into contact with. All of this has led to constant potentially conflict situations which if social conditions were more difficult could take on much more unfavorable forms."

"These conflicts are most frequently presented as being ethnic: there is talk of 'an ethnic threat,' on the one hand and of the danger of assimilation on the other, of threatened national cultures and identities. Social theory (Marxist) has always managed to argue that a class relation is at the base of such conflicts--especially when the cause of the migration was the manpower market. What does your research show?"

"If we classified the people who were the sample in our research along some continuum with respect to status symbols such as income, housing, origin, education, and so on, we would get a completely clear picture to the effect that the immigrants from the other communities occupy positions on the lowest rungs of the ladder of social stratification. That is certainly the average, since in Slovenia there are also immigrants with higher education and high social status. We have not yet studied how many Slovenes there are on that lower part of the ladder and what their sociocultural features are. According to some of our research, one might suspect that the worker who is a Slovene, and that is the assumption of our research, still rises above a majority of the immigrant workers and their families with respect to those status symbols. The immigrants are what is called the 'bottom,' the extremely proletarianized part of the Slovenian social structure."

"Where do the conflicts usually occur in that structure?"

"It is a well-known phenomenon in all immigration countries that it is the connection of those immediately above and that lowest stratum that contains the greatest potential for conflict. Those who are a bit 'above' strive to label those 'at the bottom' as being still lower, to press them to the extreme margin of society so as to improve their own picture of themselves and to build self-confidence. The bearers of the stereotype usually banded about: 'they are threatening us' and 'they should be prevented from moving here and bringing their family' are in Slovenia precisely those members of that 'lower stratum' of the Slovenian working class, but with a somewhat better status situation than the immigrants."

"You have referred to as the most constructive behavior that of those who belong to the open and active ethnic group which participates in social events at all levels, which is oriented toward nontraditional values and symbols, and which is creating a new identity and culture. Did you deal at all with concepts such as 'assimilation,' 'ethnic threat,' and so on, which we encounter so frequently?"

"I do not accept at all the terms 'assimilation,' 'integration,' and so on, defined in the way we are all familiar with. The group referred to is at the same time that which is most critical toward Yugoslav society and the things happening in it, and it is altogether outside those traditional processes. It is also the case, certainly, that that group is rather highly placed in status, which presupposes both higher education and a high level of activity, but also a highly critical attitude toward the basic norms, symbols and values of the immigrant (Slovene) society and Yugoslav society as a whole. That group does not consist entirely of people with higher education, that is, individuals with academic education, it may also include skilled and highly skilled workers. Not only are they not subject to pressure for assimilation, but because of their frankness and critical orientation they are interested in innovations and changes in society even in the immediate surroundings in which they live and work. Usually these people have a good knowledge of the Slovenian language, they read it, but they also insist on preserving their own language. Aside from that, I would like to mention that terms like 'assimilation,' 'integration,' 'acculturation,' are a part of the terminology which entered sociology through the rather primitive functionalistic paradigms of research, which in the sociology of migration have already undergone thorough criticism. Common sensical explanation and everyday language took them over uncritically from sociology, and today they are used in the media, and indeed even the political jargon, in a rather oversimplified way and out of context."

"What do you refer to as primitive functionalistic paradigms of research?"

"First of all, it should be taken into account that researchers, sociologists included, have always in the study of migrations belonged to the 'host society,' to the society which is the target of the migration, since it is the one that has the power and provides the money, and if society does not itself take this into account, then that society or its institutions will

necessarily orient them toward its own 'interests,' proceeding on the premise 'that the newcomers have to be adapted as soon as possible.' This view presupposes that the newcomers must be acculturated to the basic values and symbols and patterns of participation in the society of the old settlers. But that does not happen at all in everyday life; this has been shown by the history of the large countries of immigration. In the United States, for example, what is called ethnic revivalism has emerged over the last 10 years or so: groups which back three generations ago had forgotten that they were Poles or Irish are now once again emphasizing their ethnicity all of a sudden.

"Laymen's and simplified notions about these processes can be very dangerous. For instance, I was visited by an official of a republic body which suddenly found it in a situation where it must adopt some enactment related to the immigrants in Slovenia, and he asked me straightforwardly: 'When is a man assimilated?' What he wanted from me was a definite computation with which it would be possible to determine that a particular person was no longer a Bosnian from Krajina, but had become a Slovene. It is precisely that kind of stripped-down conception that can be very dangerous. At the same time, precisely because of a fear of that primitive conception of assimilation, in Slovenia they have not found it suitable to undertake anything at all in the field of immigration policy, out of a strong fear of its being said that they are trying assimilate them. But we are dealing with everyday, I would almost say normal, conflicts in the community of immigration which every society, especially a self-managed society, must know how to resolve."

"Could you cite some of the 'awkward moves' which are a consequence of a lack of awareness and the nonexistence of an immigration policy?"

"There was a case, for example, when housing policy, that is, allocation of housing units representing solidarity, was conducted in enterprises so that people from other communities were privileged. As a political matter, this was very reckless. The reaction of the Slovenes, though not in public, was very harsh. The consequence of that kind of behavior could become the opposite of what was desired. At the same time I am not neglecting the real need of the workers from the other republics and provinces to obtain housing, that they need more housing units, since they are at the bottom of the social ladder."

"But it is very difficult to conduct an 'intelligent' immigration policy, especially when migrations are still taking place: probably they do not succeed in this in any country?"

"It is very difficult, but today in Europe we are nevertheless dealing with a very precise term: immigration policy in the large countries of immigration is a sector of policy with a definite field of interest and method of decisionmaking which are the concern of specialists. Behind every immigration policy there is a definite value orientation; it is a picture of the cultural and value orientation of the entire system. Switzerland, for example, does not have an immigration policy, nor will it have."

"Why?"

"Because the existence of an immigration policy would at the same time signify recognition of the differentness of a large segment of immigrants in society at large. As soon as a policy exists 'toward something,' then that 'something' is also recognized. Sweden has the most long-standing and highly developed immigration policy, with a separate minister, as does Norway as well. The French resisted for a long time, but in the period of Giscard they established a separate ministry. This is no longer a question of 'social welfare' and palliative solutions, but of a special type of government activity which is not covered either by external or internal affairs. The Germans have been the last to take up this question. For a long time they did not even recognize the permanent presence of the immigrants, which is why they enthusiastically took up the terms which we launched: 'temporary employment' and 'Gostarbeiter.' For a long time they did not recognize the foreign worker as a partner at all. The fact that Sweden has gone furthest and was the first to begin to articulate an immigration policy is also shown by the fact that the foreign workers there also have certain political rights and they have civil status. In other countries they are citizens without rights."

"Your research showed that the 'non-Slovenes,' although deprived in other areas of life and status symbols, show great interest and a kind of 'ability to penetrate' sociopolitical activities, from membership in the trade union and the League of Communists to official positions, at the lower level to be sure, but official positions nevertheless. What is the real sociological weight of that datum?"

"A precise answer could be given to that question only if we possessed a thorough survey on the social composition (class, stratum and status) of the immigrant society, that is, of Slovenian society. That insight would make it possible for us to understand which of the real channels for vertical social mobility. Today we have no such basic information at all, not only in the case of Slovenia, but this also applied to Yugoslav society as a whole, and that is one of the great deficiencies of our sociology. If we had that insight, we might reach a conclusion as to why the immigrants use more frequently, or to a greater degree than the Slovenes, the so-called political channel for vertical mobility. In the everyday and common sensical interpretation, we usually hear that they are 'more vocal,' 'accustomed to discussions,' 'accustomed to speak in public,' and so on. It seems to me that there is some truth in all this. People from the southern parts of the country probably do have a different political foundation than the Slovenes, but I cannot pronounce a true sociological judgment, since, as I have said, I do not have enough data for that. But on the basis of certain experiences, it is well known that emigrants are the most dynamic and almost the most able portion of the population which they are leaving, and that means that they are determined to use everything available to them to improve their status, which is a priori low in the community they have come to. That being the case, they seek the channels which are 'readiest to hand.'"

"How is it that in Slovenia they hit upon precisely the political channels; are they sufficiently effective, and how is it that the majority society, that is, the Slovenes, has permitted them to do this so indifferently?"

"It is no wonder at all that they have chosen precisely those channels. In the research which we did 10 years ago here in Slovenia and in Macedonia, we found that the channel of political activity was the most frequent and effective means of vertical mobility. Certainly, it should also be taken into account in this connection that it is accessible only to a restricted group, and even among the workers from other communities--to those who already have permanent employment, and that 'good' employment, those who have a place to live, and so on. It is difficult to say why the Slovenians allow them to do this without the research I mentioned. But it seems that the well-situated groups rarely make use of those channels."

"You yourself are a 'newcomer' in Slovenia (S. Meznaric did her university work in Zagreb)--to be sure, with high status. What have been your personal experiences in this community?"

"I came to Ljubljana because of a job which was offered to me and which interested me, and, as you say, I have not had any problems whatsoever with respect to status. But I still do not dare to write or speak Slovenian 'in public,' although I have learned the language, but for the present, as a matter of personal judgment, only for 'private' use. In myself, as in others, I detect all kinds of stereotyped reactions. There are occasions when I react like the hero of that anecdote (published in the newspapers) who in a large Slovenian collective, in a meeting, shouted out in 'pure' Serbo-Croatian: 'So how long are we going to have to work for those in the south?!' But I have also had this kind of experience: In recent months because of my departure for the United States and travel preparations I quit my job. During the medical examinations in the health center the nurse asked me where I worked. I answered that I am not employed, and she automatically entered under 'occupation': 'None.' I asked why, and she answered that unemployed people with last names ending in 'ić' (Slovenian last names end in 'ič') usually do not have a definite occupation."

7045

CSO: 2800/281

UNDESIRABILITY OF SHORT TERMS FOR OFFICIALS ARGUED

Belgrade ILUSTROVANA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian No 1321, 28 Feb 84 pp 10-11

[Article by Miroslav Stojanovic: "How What Was Secondary Became the Main Thing"]

[Text] The publication of the names of the candidates to be new members of the SFRY State Presidency is only a remote pretext for reviving the discussion of a topic that was an extremely hot one until almost yesterday--application of the idea of collective work and decisionmaking--this time without elevated temperature.

The indisputably great and valuable experience of the SFRY State Presidency in collective work and decisionmaking was an example even in those pioneering moments of the euphoric and feverish effort to implement Tito's initiative taken at the congress of trade unions in November 1978 as soon as possible and as fully and broadly as possible.

Having won popular acceptance as a revelation and encouragement, it began life with the strength of a movement. And, as often happens, in that kind of atmosphere of pronounced passions, that idea, which has several levels and is intricate, quickly began to be reduced only to one of its dimensions, not by all appearances its essential one--introduction of the short term of office.

Examples of Our Hastiness

The 1-year term of office became the measure of loyalty and acceptance of Tito's initiative. Warnings that that was not the essence and that this reduced a great idea rich in meaning to something "derived" and almost secondary, did not win ready acceptance. They even met with a certain suspicion.

In the competitive atmosphere some people were changing the bylaws of work organizations and were shortening the terms of office of professional managers. Negligible in number, these examples were more an illustration of our inclination to enter into something hastily and precipitously.

"The majority has seen in shortening the length of the term of office an opportunity and chance," NIN wrote at the time, "for a speedy and fundamental showdown with the bureaucracy, and no additional wisdom is welcome on this matter."

Obviously, Tito's idea and his words have begun to be wrongly interpreted, bypassing his intention.

Franc Setinc recalled on one occasion the conversation which the Slovenian delegation had with Tito immediately before his illness. There has been quite a bit of talk about that conversation, although the broad public has not been informed of its content.

"At that time we openly said to Comrade Tito that we were not opposed to the initiative or to collective work, but that we were looking more broadly. That is, that democratization cannot be reduced merely to the question of the 1-year term of office, but rather consists of democratization of the entire forum, and indeed more broadly of the entire society. These are decisive questions. After all, if someone has power within the limits of his term of office, that is not the consequence of the time which he spends in the particular office. We cannot change this merely by saying that he will occupy it for 1 year instead of 4."

According to Setinc's account, Tito warned at that time that when he took the initiative he was not thinking that it would be carried out in a linear way. He felt that it ought to be thought over thoroughly, and if time shows that it turns out not to be good, it ought to be changed.

What Did Tito Say?

Tito, Setinc concluded, thought of the initiative as the possibility for finding the best solutions to various alternatives, and not as a firm formula or dogma.

Length of the Term of Office of Officials in Sociopolitical Communities

<u>Office</u>	<u>Bosnia-</u>			
	<u>Yugoslavia</u>	<u>Hercegovina</u>	<u>Macedonia</u>	<u>Slovenia</u>
Chairman of the State Presidency	1	1	1	2+2
President of the Assembly	1	1	1+1	2+2
Vice presidents of the Assembly	1	1	4	2+2
Chairman of the Executive Council	4	2	4	4
	4	2	4	4
President of the opstina assembly	--	1	2	2+2
Chairman of the executive body of the opstina assembly	--	2	4	4

<u>Office</u>	<u>Serbia</u>				
	<u>Proper</u>	<u>Vojvodina</u>	<u>Kosovo</u>	<u>Croatia</u>	<u>Montenegro</u>
Chairman of the State Presidency	1+1	1	1	1	1
President of the Assembly	1+1	1	1	1	1

Table (continued)

<u>Office</u>	<u>Serbia</u>				
	<u>Proper</u>	<u>Vojvodina</u>	<u>Kosovo</u>	<u>Croatia</u>	<u>Montenegro</u>
Vice presidents of the Assembly	1+1	1	1	1	1
Chairman of the Executive Council	4	2+2	2	2+2	2+2
President of the opstina assembly	2+2	1	1+1	1	1+1
Chairman of the executive body of the opstina assembly	4	2+2	2	2+2	2+2

What did Tito say in the trade union congress in making the case for his initiative? He warned at that time that technocratic and bureaucratic usurpation, bureaucratic arbitrariness and unwholesome leaderist ambitions have to be thwarted. He called for a greater effort to be made to develop self-management in the delegate system, and that was why he proposed that collective work be applied thoroughly and nurtured "in all self-management and government bodies, delegate assemblies, forums and bodies of sociopolitical communities." At the same time he mentioned the 1-year term of office as one of the means of achieving the goal.

As time has passed, what was secondary had in practice become the main thing, in many situations indeed the only thing, with that degree of confidence that is the only correct and acceptable thing which leaves very little room for a different attitude.

Recalling that collective work, decisionmaking and responsibility are not something unknown in the history of democratic political thought, Dr Jovan Marjanovic, professor, has said:

"The revival of that idea in our context occurred at what I would say was the right moment, at a time when the delegate system was just getting started and self-management was gaining strength with it, so that this certainly could not have tolerated the very frequent and obvious occurrences of usurpation of political functions and leaderism, which had already assumed disturbing dimensions. In that conflict between self-management and those manifestational forms of bureaucracy rapid and decisive action had to be taken. Tito offered a solution which the majority accepted. Especially since all of us were witnesses of how well that had functioned at the highest level of government, at that time the only collective body--the SFRY State Presidency."

This idea has not been carried out without difficulties. On the one hand, Professor Marjanovic feels, there was resistance, covert, on the part of those forces which as a practical matter were the reason for this initiative in the first place, and on the other hand collegial bodies began to be introduced in both the right places and also the wrong places. Everyone had his arguments, and it all revolved around the length of the term of office, which is actually a question that one remove from the heart of the matter.

The Warnings Begin

At just about the time when it almost appeared that the short term of office had survived all the objections and had in a way become an untouchable political fact, several distinguished politicians came forth with warnings about one-sidedness in the conception and application of Tito's initiative.

In 1982 Mitja Ribicic said in an interview with Radio Belgrade that mentioning the length of the term of office was a one-sided conception of Tito's initiative.

Nikola Ljubicic in a conference in the Belgrade Opstina Stari Grad was still more direct:

"In my opinion, it seems that we have not sufficiently understood Comrade Tito's idea. It has come to seem that collective leadership and responsibility could be achieved merely through the 1-year term of office.... It has been and is now my view that this is not a good solution. I think that the term of office should be longer. The present arrangement can be retained for certain of the highest bodies, for certain positions like my own (chairman of the State Presidency of SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia--M. S.), for example, but in opstinas and certain other places this ought to be changed."

Mika Spiljak warned at one time that there were "opstinas in which there are widespread cases where almost entire leadership teams cease to be members of certain forums because of the term of office, since they are going off to other leadership positions. The new president is usually a new man who has not been in that forum. To my mind that is an evasion of Tito's initiative." To recall, at the time when Tito announced his initiative, Spiljak was chairman of the Federation of Yugoslav Trade Unions.

Today, incidentally, it is a rather widespread belief that instead of a tug-of-war about the length of the term of office, it is extremely important to see to consistent respect for the collective term of office. When the term of office of the chairman expires, that man might remain in the presidium or whatever body. Termination of the chairmanship does not signify that the person should withdraw physically from the collective body. In such a situation there would be neither collective work nor responsibility.

Obviously, the length of the term of office is a secondary question, a question that one remove from the heart of the matter. More thorough analysis, which unfortunately has been lacking, would by all appearances show that collective work and responsibility can be achieved even without shortening the term of office, as well as the fact that mere introduction of the shorter term of office does not signify that Tito's initiative has been truly accepted and carried out.

Calmly and Without a Campaign

Will the short term of office last for a long time yet?

What is quite certain now is that cool heads are talking calmly about this topic, without overstrong emotions. Even the advocates of doing away with the shorter term of office are advising soberness, calmness, an analytical attitude and an absence of any sort of campaign in this matter. It would be a good thing, they feel, to thoroughly analyze the good and the bad that have come from the short term of office. There are "plenty" of categories on both sides. The short term of office has shaken up many powerful people. Many groups "in hiding" have been divested of power, there has been greater mobility of people (at present stronger and fresher winds are blowing, only their direction is mainly horizontal). At the same time in some situations there has also been a detectable averaging out of ability, voluntarism, ineffectiveness, a lack of initiative and risk, a calculating attitude, irresponsibility and opportunism, imposition of the executive and administrative power of the "apparatchik," who for years has been in the same position, without, of course, changing either his way of thought or his own world of ideas.

Has the short term of office merely exposed weaknesses which existed even before its introduction, out of sight of the public? Quite probably. The term of office is only a drop in the ocean of a series of much more important conditions for a wholesome personnel policy. That is why the advocates of a longer term of office know that in no case does that signify a turning back of the clock. Tito's initiative is not a transient political experiment. It raises major issues concerning the democratization of personnel policy (and thereby of the entire society as well) and of rendering public accounts concerning all important social matters and responsibility. The length of the term of office, of course, has an important place in all that, but by no means the central and most important place.

In the discussions of the functioning of the political system and in the analyses which are being made or prepared, attention is being centered with good reason on personnel policy. That is, it is obvious that even if all the solutions embodying our system were as good as could be, we could hardly expect any very great progress without selection, which presupposes that everything that is creative and willing to commit itself would be manifested. And initiative and creativity have never been limited by the length of a term of office.

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CSO: 2800/287

'LOST YEAR' ASSERTED IN LIGHT OF STABILIZATION PROGRAM

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1735, 1 Apr 84
pp 11-12

[Article by Scepan Rabrenovic]

[Text] "All the issues which were outstanding last summer are outstanding even now."

That is how Slobodan Milosevic, member of the Presidium of the Serbian LC Central Committee, commented on what has been done so far in carrying out the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program at a meeting held a few days ago in the Federal Conference of the SAWPY. This comment was also the best explanation of the country's present economic condition, which is marked more by appeals for action than by action itself.

The situation is not only confusing, but in many respects even dramatic: losses are piling up, the domestic debt is catching up with the foreign debt, the standard of living has dropped to the verge of supportability from the standpoint of social welfare, and the soon-to-come thawing of prices threatens a high inflation. In that same meeting Slobodan Milosevic put the question: "Where is the limit on sacrifice and the limit on the decline? That is the price which is willingly paid to achieve the goal, but it is also a price which no one is willing to pay in order to remain in a position of stagnation and crisis."

The List of Obligations

Milka Planinc, chairwoman of the Federal Executive Council [SIV], along with certain other SIV members, have often reiterated that everyone must do his part concerning the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program.

However, no one talks about exactly what those jobs are.

When this program was adopted sometime last July, a precise enumeration was issued as to who would do everything, the nature of the task and the deadline for its performance so that the program, divided into three phases, would be carried out. The Federal Executive Council was made responsible for most of the jobs, especially for carrying out the first phase of the Program, which

presupposed changes in price policy, tax policy, monetary and credit policy, the foreign exchange system, and also changes in the system of accounting for reckoning gross income and income.

All of this was to be done by the end of last year so that all of that could be an integral part of the resolution adopted for this year.

At the same time the Federal Executive Council was given the responsibility of proposing essential changes in four federal laws, laws embodying the system: the foreign exchange law, the law on planning, the law on prices, and the law on gross income and income.

Changes in the foreign exchange system were proposed last year, but they were actually only cosmetic in nature, and it can be said of what was adopted from the proposal that it confused even more the already confused situation with foreign exchange. (In addition, the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia regards the foreign exchange law, including those amendments, unconstitutional.)

Last fall changes were also announced in the tax system, but the Federal Executive Council itself soon renounced what had been proposed, since it turned out that this was contrary to the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program.

Even today the changes assigned in monetary and credit policy and in the policy concerning accounting in determination of gross income and income have not been forthcoming, and instead of changing overall price policy and the law on prices, the Federal Executive Council decided to freeze prices.

The Impact of Many Packages

With all this in mind, it was not in a position to expect others to do "their share of the job" either, since their obligations could be defined only after the Federal Executive Council had done what it was assigned to do.

The measures of current economic policy adopted in the meantime were commented on as follows by Aleksandar Grlickov at that same meeting of the Federal Council of the SAWPY: "We speak loudly about the necessity of the operation of economic laws, and with the same intensity we are feeding in packages consisting of coercive administrative measures, administrative regulation of relations. These things simply do not go together."

At that same meeting Slobodan Milosevic also spoke about the quality of these measures: "Will the battle the subjective forces are entering into be the authentic battle, the battle for the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program, or will it be reduced to the activity of the subjective forces in supporting measures of current economic policy adopted from one day to the next, measures which have very little relation or no relation whatsoever to the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program?"

Milosevic went on to say that we must not allow the subjective forces to become advocates of current measures which do not take us out of the crisis, but take us into a deeper crisis, and there must be no illusion that the crisis can be overcome with all those packages.

Nor did the new measures which are to follow before and after the price thaw win a passing mark at that meeting. It was said of them that they continue to insist on administrative regulation and to push aside the economic stabilization program. Yet those who have had the "package" of those measures in their hands and who are well-versed in these problems say that they contain a bit of everything, indeed even "obligations" for obtaining "rubber belts, spare parts, chemicals for plant pest and disease control...."

That "package" also contains continued insistence on income-sharing relations, on administrative price margins, but also a division into federal, republic and opstina prices. That accounts for the fear that the last price freeze might be used up heedlessly.

Could the Federal Executive Council have done more than it has? Immediately after adoption of the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program there were those among the members of the federal government who said that the time was short and the job was big. In the meantime a commission was formed for implementing the Program, whose members included the chairwoman of SIV with her vice chairmen, the prime ministers of the republics and provinces, and certain economists "on the staff" of the federal government.

Later some members of SIV justified the slowness in implementing the economic stabilization program by saying that this commission had "taken away their power." That was perhaps true to some extent, but how is one to explain that SIV chairwoman Milka Planinc was at the same time the chairwoman of that commission?

The work (and output) of that commission has been commented on in various ways. Aleksandar Grlickov did it in this way at the meeting mentioned in the Federal Conference of the SAWPY: "We constructed a conceptual program for economic stabilization which was actually the conceptual program for social stabilization; unfortunately we have not continued with the same intensity and the same intellectual and expert capability in drafting the plan for carrying out that conceptual program."

This comment can probably be explained by the fact that more than 500 scientists and scholars from throughout the country--indeed its entire intellectual capability--were involved in drafting the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program.

However, on the basis of what this commission has proposed one can get an idea of what it has done. The main impression is that in the meetings of the commission the debates were opened up once again about those outstanding issues which, so at least it seemed, had been resolved during the drafting of the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program and had been clearly defined in it. That opened up a new round of disputes, and the debates began once again about what had already been debated.

When the commission was formed, it was justifiably assumed that its task was only to "translate" the stabilization program into specific measures and specific laws. Especially since its job was made easier by the fact that the

Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program contained not only the theoretical and conceptual basis for the development of the system of socialist self-management, but also 19 separate studies on each social and economic area separately.

The following example is evidence that discussions believed to have been superseded did actually open up in that commission: it is reliably known that the group headed by SIV vice chairman Borislav Srebric had drawn up a worthwhile proposal of the new foreign exchange system, but it was rejected in the commission itself on the grounds that if it were adopted "the workers would be left without foreign exchange." Yet the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program did not envisage that the workers would have foreign exchange at their disposal.

Ideological Divisions

This blockage in carrying out the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program can be explained not only by preservation of positions acquired in the predominantly administrative and statist economic system such as we have had in recent years (the republics, which 10 years ago, say, had a shortage of foreign exchange, are now the richest when it comes to foreign exchange), but also by ideological differences on certain issues concerning the future development of the system of socialist self-management and also different explanations as to why we fell into the crisis.

Stated in simple terms, those differences come down to the following: on the one hand are those who stubbornly defend the present situation by giving assurances that absolutely everything can be worked out with self-management accords and social compacts, and on the other those who believe that without specific changes in the economic system and greater respect for objective economic laws society cannot develop on a self-management foundation.

It is certain that it has not been easy for the Federal Executive Council in such a situation, but it is equally certain that it would have been much easier for it if it had done what it was commissioned to do. Only when the proposals are made public is it possible to see who is in favor of changes and who against them, and what the role of SIV has been in all of this.

This way, by the mere fact that SIV has insisted most on individual measures, and not a single individual measure, however, good it might be, has a chance unless the totality of the economic system is changed, the impression is that there is not enough strength to fulfill the obligations assumed. So it is no wonder that the Federal Executive Council has become the greatest critic and that at the same time "that criticism contrasts with the vigor of the proposals which SIV is submitting for adoption," as Slobodan Milosevic put it in the meeting we have mentioned in the Federal Conference of the SAWPY.

Of course, there are also those who take up individual successes (the growth of exports and maintenance of production last year, for example) in a desire to explain how everything is fine in the economic system and that it is enough just to alter behavior, for the "people to be a bit more aware and a

bit more disciplined." (Later, when it is time for changes in the political system, that would serve them as justification for opposing changes.)

It is true that exports were up last year to the convertible market by 13 percent and that production did after all increase somewhat. However, it is well known that total exports were up only 1 percent and that there was actually a "redistribution": goods were transferred from the eastern to the western market. One does not need to conjecture as to what would have happened last year with exports and production if there had been no financial support from abroad. Which also applies to what could happen if the country were to constantly, every year, depend on foreign financial aid in order to achieve, for instance, the results of last year.

It is no accident that the so-called reserve version of development, that is, the version which presupposes renunciation of financial aid from abroad, has been launched "into circulation." It can be assumed that it was made public so that we would all realize where we stand, but it is no accident that Aleksandar Grlickov described it in this way at the meeting mentioned in the Federal Conference of the SAWPY: "In essence the reserve version is contrary to self-management."

If that is really the case, and it appears to be, then the question arises: Why is that version of development preferred over the economic and social development such as set down in the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program?

There are still quite a few different versions and different wrinkles, as though people do not fully grasp the time in which we are living. The obligations based on foreign credits alone over the next several years are so great that they "take away" about 80 percent of total social accumulation, and that provided that the social product increases at a rate of 3 percent over those years. If we add to that obligation obligations based on differences in rates of exchange and the losses of the economy, then we realize that over the next several years it is hard to see how even a single dinar can be set aside for development.

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CSO: 2800/290

PASIC INTERVIEWED ON NEED FOR CHANGE IN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian No 262, 10 Mar 84 pp 10-13

[Interview with Dr Najdan Pasic, member of the LCY Central Committee, by Vesna Malisic: "Illusions Only Postpone the Changes"]

[Text] [Question] When people speak of changes in the political system, are they referring to changes in the system itself and its institutions, or are they thinking of rather minor "corrections" in the system and a change in behavior in practice?

[Answer] I think that that is a false dilemma. If we have a system of social self-management which has a particular class-political content, then we also have to seek the forms of political organization which correspond to the nature of that social and class system. By changes in the political system we should imply equipping the system to function more effectively in conformity with its class nature and the federal arrangement of the Yugoslav community.

It is not dialectical to say that everything is fine as far as the institutions are concerned and that only behavior should be changed. The institutions are there in order to regulate behavior. If in practice they allow certain tendencies which patently depart from the course of development expressed in the constitution, then it is obvious that we must not make a fetish of those institutions.

[Question] Why is it that some people nevertheless take a tragic view of the possibility of any changes in the political system. Who is for maintaining the "status quo," and who is for radical changes in the political system?

[Answer] Well, you know, what is set forth in the constitution undoubtedly expresses the continuity of our revolution, but it is also the result of a struggle in which there was not always a priori accord on particular issues. The political system has also been influenced by the given balance of power in our society. There is a fear that to work on constitutional changes at this point could open up a number of issues which are regarded as already resolved.

There is, I would say, a specific balance of power which the various principals evaluate differently, and there is an abhorrence of the possibility of calling into question what has already been set down as a lasting achievement of our political system of socialist self-management.

[Question] Which does not mean that the system must be defended at any price?

[Answer] Indeed, the political system cannot be defended, cannot be built up further, if we close our eyes to its defects. That would be an antidialectical approach.

[Question] There has been talk in recent years about the ever larger gap between what has been proclaimed as a goal and what is happening in practice.

[Answer] We have many examples of that. Our basic and lasting orientation is that we are opening the doors wide to the processes of self-management integration, to the free pooling of labor and capital throughout the entire economic space of Yugoslavia, since that is a condition for achieving what is our goal, and that is for associated labor to take control over the entire processes of expanded reproduction, that is, to take command of "social capital." But we see that something altogether different is occurring in practice.

[Question] What is happening?

[Answer] For example, the shattering of the unified Yugoslav market, the shattering of large systems in the fuel and power industry and transportation, we have pronounced cases of regional exclusiveness, of group-ownership behavior.

Kardelj Would Not Defend This

[Question] How are the political institutions, as they are presently constituted in practice, reacting to all this; where and how are they helping to suppress the negative tendencies, and where are they even in a way encouraging regional exclusiveness? How can that practice be altered?

[Answer] It can be altered in practice if we examine where and how the deviations from the basic constitutional commitments have occurred. After all, you know, the development of the political system is an ongoing process. Following adoption of the constitution norms were adopted for various areas of social relations on the basis of the constitution, and that process of transforming the general constitutional principles into concrete solutions for various situations has not been taking place in some vacuum. It has indeed been influenced by a conflict among quite narrow specific interests. What seems an acceptable solution for certain forces in society when it is a matter of a statement of principle becomes unacceptable when those solutions have to be put in precise and concrete terms. It is then that the specific lineup of forces I have already spoken about is manifested.

[Question] And what is that lineup of forces in our society?

[Answer] Often the balance of power is not favorable for the working class. Its objective material position is not such that the working class can in all phases, through all forms of the legislative process, at the level of the Federation, the republics, the provinces and opstinas, exert a decisive influence on the concrete content of various decisions and solutions. And under the pressure of that balance of power there often are departures from the basic conception, so that what has been set forth in the constitution as a possible exception to the rule becomes the rule, so to speak, without exception, and what was envisaged as a solution for the moment is transformed into something permanent and all of this is defended as though it were defense of the constitution itself, although often it is a case of departure from the constitutional principles.

[Question] You recently said: "Never has there been a higher degree of dependence of associated labor on centers of political decisionmaking, and yet again we have never had a greater gap between what is politically defined as the goal and what is happening in practice." What is the reason for the distortion of the very character of associated labor?

[Answer] It is because the bureaucratic-technocratic forces still have the means of expanded reproduction under their firm command. For objective reasons, but also subjective reasons, there is a great deal of administrative meddling in the flows of social reproduction, and something which the constitution defines very restrictively, and that is the right to regulate the conditions for the conduct of economic activity, is transformed into something much more than that. That is, if that right is interpreted extensively, and in our case it is so interpreted, then we get a kind of restoration of state-ownership relations; and we get in turn a renewal of "state capital" in a camouflaged form.

[Question] Does that mean that direct management of the means of expanded reproduction by the worker is becoming, then, more and more fictitious?

[Answer] Yes, that is indeed the case if every action of an organization of associated labor and its entire activity depend on numerous administrative measures, on an economic policy burdened with many improvisations. Combinations come together here in a very complicated way between real needs arising out of the disrupted economic flows on the one hand, so that we are forced to use measures of administrative intervention to a greater degree than would be desirable, while on the other hand, there is the partly spontaneous and partly deliberate aspiration of the stratum of professional political managers to retain what Kardelj referred to as the "position of the agent of the owner of the social means of reproduction," that is, to appropriate unto itself all the rights which a nonexistent owner of the social means of production would have. And that is in essence a tendency toward restoration of monopoly ownership by the state.

[Question] When some people speak about changes in the political system, they associate this with "de-Kardelj-ization."

[Answer] Kardelj's contribution to construction of the political system of socialist self-management is truly very great. Now, however, his authority is being used in an attempt to defend everything that has occurred in the application of the constitution, and quite often this has been a departure from the constitutional ideas and from what Comrade Kardelj advocated. If we are to defend the constitution, then we have to remove the taboos from certain topics, since Kardelj was a great opponent of petrifying any particular situation and of making a fetish of institutions once they are created. Actually, he looked upon the political system as a dynamic element in overall social relations, an element whose function is to push forward, to make changes easier, not to conserve a particular state of affairs.

The Chain Has Snapped Somewhere

[Question] It is the prevailing opinion that the delegate system, though well conceived in theory, has been transformed into a dry organizational mechanism for the production of decisions, instead of being the main artery of the political system of self-management democracy. Is that the case, and if so--why?

[Answer] I think that our delegate system, because of the lag in development of production relations, has not yet reached that level of development where we can free ourselves and for us in practice to already be freeing ourselves of all the elements of representative political democracy. Illusions of this kind only make it more difficult to build up the delegate system.

[Question] Is it possible, assuming all that to be the case, to reconcile the differing interests which are a reality in our life, and are other egoistic, and indeed even subjective political interests hiding behind a facade of differing interests in self-management?

[Answer] Our political system is based on pluralism of interests in self-management. There are cases in practice when that self-management pluralism of interests is being replaced more and more by a pluralism of institutions representing interests, institutions, I would say, of the corporate type. This could be a powerful source of potential deformations of the delegate system. The position of the basic self-managing organizations and communities, and of organizations of associated labor above all, is not such that those organizations can examine their future over the long run and their real interests. That is why we do not have enough direct thrusts coming from the base for delegate decisionmaking. The delegate base is becoming passive, and there are cases when delegations hover like a corncrib on stilts, neither in heaven nor on the earth. In a situation where the delegate system is not functioning effectively, the structures consisting of professional political managers assume great independence. Behind the screen of the delegate system social power structures are formed which take over what formally belongs to the bodies of delegates.

[Question] Have such tendencies become stronger recently?

[Answer] Yes, they have!

[Question] And why?

[Answer] Because we have a renewal of state-ownership relations, and that generates statist deformations in the delegate system. That accounts for a rather widespread disappointment in the delegate system.

[Question] Research conducted into what people think about the delegate system and how they perceive it in practice shows that they had greater expectations 8 years ago than they have today. What do you think of this?

[Answer] It is evident that the working people believe less than they did that the delegations, the delegate assemblies and that entire chain linking the self-managing organizations and communities with the centers of political decisionmaking actually make up an effective mechanism through which they can realize their interests.

[Question] It is felt that the delegate system is often slow and ineffective. If that is so, what are the consequences?

[Answer] Yes, it is slow, above all because of the high degree of institutionalization of partial interests. Institutionalization of the expression and confrontation of interests always signifies a strengthening of the forms of political mediation, and that is accentuated even more because of weaknesses in the overall position of associated labor. Because of the blockade brought about by the conflict among institutionalized partial interests, the need arises for external arbitration of the individual centers of political power. If, say, within a work organization or complex organization of associated labor, a war breaks out among the basic organizations of which they are constituted, a space is thereby created for political intervention. The party committee becomes involved, the trade union intervenes to arbitrate and to unravel those knots. And all of that strengthens the actual dependence of associated labor on centers of political decisionmaking.

[Question] How is that ad hoc decisionmaking to be precluded, and how is it to be possible for that flow of energy from the base to the centers of political decisionmaking to be established in a more synchronized way?

[Answer] This can be achieved only if stable conditions are created for the business operation of organizations of associated labor and self-managing entities in general. That would also avoid the ever greater burdening of the party with the functions of day-to-day management.

The "Package" Checkmated

[Question] The League of Communists and the organs of other sociopolitical organizations sometimes do take on functions in day-to-day management.

[Answer] That phenomenon quite often takes on disturbing proportions. The forums of the LC take it upon themselves to make altogether concrete economic decisions, and workers' councils and delegate assemblies are left only to take note of this and carry out the formal adoption.

[Question] Are the organizations of associated labor themselves adapting to this "political tutelage"?

[Answer] Instead of the basic and other organizations of associated labor seeing their future and seeking solutions for their problems in improving their own organization and establishing ties with one another on behalf of the most economical employment of the resources for expanded reproduction, they are oriented toward exerting pressure on the relevant political and government forums so as to bring about adoption of this or that administrative measure that is favorable to them or a change of a piece of legislation which does not suit them. We get, then, a pragmatic adaptation of associated labor to a given situation. It might be said that associated labor is more and more holding on to the skirts of "its own" political bureaucracy, seeking protection from it, accepting its tutelage under the pressure of circumstances.

[Question] Do you associate the economic stabilization with changes in the political system? To what degree are the economic disturbances bound up with disturbances in the political system, and the other way about? And what should be stabilized first? The political system or the economic situation? Or are both of them first?

[Answer] Those are two sides of the single and unified set of problems. The political system is the factor that determines the ability of the organized social forces to influence the directions in which society is moving. A decline of that ability has the direct and maximum impact of making it more difficult to resolve economic problems. The economic stabilization program cannot be carried out if the system of political decisionmaking and conduct of the established policy is not functioning as it should. At the same time, the delegate system and the other institutions of our political system cannot function successfully unless the economic position of associated labor is stable. There is a most direct connection, then, between the economic stabilization program which has been adopted and the changes which have to be carried out in the political system.

[Question] Tell us specifically what you are referring to.

[Answer] The Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program insists on building a more stable position of associated labor, on reducing the degree of its dependence on the decisions of the bodies of the sociopolitical community, above all of their executive bodies, on creating space for freer operation of objective economic laws, on creating conditions under which basic organizations of associated labor would behave like producers of commodities for the market and would orient themselves according to the criteria and needs of rational economic employment of resources for expanded reproduction. That program speaks out directly against exaggerated ad hoc administrative meddling in the flows of expanded reproduction, and that also goes in the direction of stabilization of the political system and overcoming those weaknesses which are now manifesting themselves in its functioning. The resolutions of the 10th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee, which speak about implementing the economic stabilization program also insist on this. All intervention by

political forums, committees and other bodies in economic flows exceeding what has been envisaged by the constitution is condemned.

[Question] Are you also referring to the "packages" which are putting the self-managers in a checkmate position?

[Answer] To the "packages" and also to other decisions of the bodies of sociopolitical organizations which take on the character of ad hoc administrative interventions in solving particular economic problems. There is no doubt, then, that the closest interdependence exists between the two processes. We cannot carry out the economic stabilization unless we alter and improve the political system as an instrument for carrying out the economic stabilization policy, nor in turn can the political system begin to live its full life or the delegate system truly become the backbone of the entire process of political decisionmaking unless we achieve the goals of economic stabilization.

The Exception as the Rule

[Question] Academician Lukic has coined the word "SIZ-ophrenia" [a pun on "schizophrenia"; SIZ stands for "self-managing community of interest"].

[Answer] The difficulties arise from the fact that the self-managing communities of interest were not created in the way that was envisaged in principle in the constitution. The constitution foresaw that the SIZ's would be formed by law only as an exception. But that has, so to speak, become a rule without exception, and the communities of interest are in fact a creation of republic and provincial legislation, which certainly puts its imprint on those institutions. In practice they behave like government agencies toward those whose interests they are supposed to express and for whom they are supposed to be a link in the system of self-management. That is how the staffs in those communities assume great power. As a rule those staffs are very ramified and highly complicated mechanisms of decisionmaking, and all of that tends to multiply the administration in the SIZ's, which assume managerial functions, although the relevant government agencies also exist for the same fields. In that way new forms of alienated administrative and political power come into being under a self-management front, and they are not sufficiently subject to oversight.

[Question] So what will we do with SIZ's of that kind?

[Answer] I think that we should be resolute in going back to the constitutional concept for organizing the SIZ's, that is, reduce them truly to a self-management framework in which agreements are reached, rather than constantly giving them more and more managerial functions.

[Question] How is the delegate assembly constantly being "put out of the game"?

[Answer] For one thing, because various coordinating bodies are being formed and institutionalized and they work out things in advance so that little

opportunity is left for real decisionmaking by the delegate assemblies. Social compacts are drawn up on the principles of self-management regulation of relations in various sectors which are supposed to replace government regulation in those areas: But in practice the social compacts often take on the character of enactments adopted outside the normal democratic procedure in the assemblies of the sociopolitical communities.

[Question] Who are the signatories of the compacts?

[Answer] The people who head what I call the corporations and institutions. They are the president of the assembly of the sociopolitical community, the chairman or representative of the executive council, of the economic chamber, of the trade union, of the LC conference, of the Socialist Alliance, and so on, that is, a relatively small body. When that kind of compact is signed by these "leading figures," it does not even pass through all that complicated, but democratic, procedure which applies to other normative acts and regulations. In the name of self-management, then, the delegate assembly is put out of the game to a greater or lesser extent. Something is instituted which has the character of an extraconstitutional institution. The signatories of the compact then take on the function of monitoring how the compact is carried out and they take a position toward proposals and solutions which are supposed to be adopted by the delegate assembly. This position actually prejudices the decision taken by the assembly.

[Question] Can one speak in a way about "expropriation" of the rights of the delegate assemblies?

[Answer] I fear that because of the weaknesses already mentioned in the functioning of the political system set forth in the constitution, certain new extraconstitutional forms are being generated in its shadow and to a greater or lesser degree they are expropriating the rights of the delegate assemblies. And then, of course, the assemblies of sociopolitical communities and self-managing communities lose their authority. That leads to a lack of interest and zeal on the part of delegations and delegates, since ready-made solutions are being suggested to them which they are supposed to confirm and adopt as a mere formality.

[Question] How is it that that kind of deformation has occurred in the system? What has made it possible for these uncontrolled processes to take place?

[Answer] This is occurring spontaneously, so to speak, since there are weaknesses in the functioning of associated labor, there have not been enough thrusts of energy operating from the social base of self-management. The process of political decisionmaking does not tolerate vacuums. Yet the delegate assemblies work slowly, if they are not organized so that they can make decisions effectively, if the principle of mandatory accord of all participants in the decisionmaking process is imposed both where it should be and where it should not be, then the executive bodies and other bodies take over the functions of the delegate assembly.

An Evaluation for Every Term of Office

[Question] Are there similar dangers in the case of higher education as some people are already indicating?

[Answer] Perhaps I will anger those who are working to reorganize higher education, but the character and possible impact of certain of the innovations proposed ought to be critically assessed once again. I am thinking above all of the proposed formation of councils for the various groups of sciences. Those councils at the level of the republic would be made up, according to the proposal, of a number of professors elected by the assembly of the special-interest community and representatives of other interests in society. Those bodies, then, are given authority every year to examine the program of all the subjects being taught in a particular area. The idea is not to finance instruction in a particular subject, but the particular syllabus of that instruction. That means that the syllabus for every subject is to be subject to constant verification exercised by the special-interest community through the council. The possibility is created for the syllabus in surgery, labor law or neurobiology to be assessed once again every year. Doesn't this amount to creation of a new power over associated labor in that sphere of social activity? What position are the universities and the various university schools then being put into? Not to mention the kind of administration that would then be created and the amount of time and money that would be spent....

We are speaking, of course, only about proposals which have yet to be put in their final form. But perhaps this is the right time to warn of the possible bad consequences of certain of the solutions which have been proposed.

[Question] Do you think that it is time for the party to free itself more and more of managerial functions?

[Answer] The party has to free itself of all functions in day-to-day management and to be less and less subject to the pressure of management structures, and that is a big unsolved problem.

[Question] How to avoid the process whereby political forums and government agencies once again grow together under the new conditions and are blended together?

[Answer] I have already said that certain unnatural partnerships are being created between particular entities in our political system. In my opinion there is an unnatural partnership between, say, the leadership of the Socialist Alliance and the executive council of an assembly or the Presidency. Those are all bodies which have their place in the framework of the political system and the delegate mechanism for decisionmaking, and now all of a sudden they emerge as partners which reconcile certain particular interests with one another, and their agreement replaces the normal procedure of delegate decisionmaking. This is among the problems which we have not elucidated enough in critical terms.

[Question] This is obviously also an area for changes to be made.

[Answer] Yes, and that in the sense of eliminating all the elements of departure from the constitutional concept of the delegate system and of eliminating the extraconstitutional forms of decisionmaking which are being set up behind the screen of self-management institutions and delegate assemblies.

[Question] How is individual responsibility in collective work functioning? Can it be separated, and is it always being separated?

[Answer] Here again some improvements and changes are needed. One line for further development of the system of responsibility would be for responsibility never to be stated only in declarative terms anywhere, but for a mechanism to be set up whereby accounts are rendered for performance in office, and this would be foreseen as something mandatory. No one ought to end his term of office without rendering a public account on his performance. And the assessment of prior performance ought to be the principal criterion for the further classification of personnel and for assignment of positions to them. The mechanical succession at points of leadership ought to be eliminated, that circular rotation in positions of leadership which is agreed on in advance.

[Question] Do you think that it is high time to put an end to the critical analysis of the political system and undertake to correct the deformations which have befallen us, regardless of how?

[Answer] To be brief, I do think so! The effort is being made, not always fast enough or effectively enough, but still quite a bit has been done in this 1.5 years. There are interesting studies which have been written and on which a group is working which was specifically created for critical analysis of the functioning of the political system.

I hope that the period before us will be more fruitful, even in terms of results.

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